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ABSTRACT
Risky Business : Moral Arguments Against the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987, Can Consent Be 
Engineered? asks the moral and ethical questions of assigning 
risk. In a democracy a fundamental principle for imposing 
risk is obtaining the consent of the governed. In the case of 
a proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada, Congress has ignored this basic principle. 
An unwilling population in a politically weak state has been 
forced to bear the burden from highly radioactive spent fuel 
from nuclear power reactors operating in the majority of 
states. The State of Nevada does not reap the benefits from 
nuclear power generation and does not operate a nuclear 
reactor. Should a single state bear the current and future 
impacts and costs from such an unwanted risk? Is there a 
democratic solution to nuclear waste management?
Ill
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"The mountain breathes, ''
Daniel Dreyfus, Director
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
Las Vegas SUN, November 14, 1994
They call it regional, this relevance —  
the deepest place we have: in this pool forms 
the model of our land, a lovely one, 
responsive to the wind. Everything we own 
has brought us here: from here we speak.
William Stafford 
Poet
''Lake Chelan''
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PREFACE
After covering the nuclear waste management issue as a 
journalist for more than two decades, I began to focus on the 
approach to high-level nuclear waste taken by the United 
States government as the subject for a Master's Degree thesis 
in Ethics and Policy Studies at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. The research has been disturbing, especially 
Congressional action on the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
Amendments of 1987. The focus of my thesis for the degree 
program concerns the moral and the ethical issues surrounding 
these actions that led to the proposed Yucca Mountain 
repository.
Specifically, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments 
raise the basic issues of equity concerning whether a risk is 
imposed or one that is voluntary, and the issue of states' 
rights. The Amendments pose a threat in each area. The first 
question here is whether a risk, such as a high-level nuclear 
waste repository, is voluntarily accepted or whether it is 
involuntarily imposed. The land designated for the repository 
is claimed by the Western Shoshone Indian Tribe and affects
vi
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23 other tribes. Under the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
and its Amendments, the tribes must be treated as sovereign 
nations and their voices heard in deliberations on the 
repository. To date, the tribes believe they have been 
ignored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and could sue 
the federal government as affected governments. The Indian 
peoples do not want this risk, and a majority of Nevada 
residents, nearing eighty percent, do not want the repository 
which is on a site owned by the public today (Bureau of Land 
Management and the U.S. Air Force). Since Nevada has no 
nuclear power plants, and neither do any of the Tribes, nor 
do they wish to accept the burden of radioactive waste, the 
repository is a discriminatory risk. However, this is hardly 
the first time in American history that the federal 
government has forced unwanted burdens on a state (for 
example, the Emancipation Proclamation).
As Dr. Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D., President of the 
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research in Takoma 
Park, Maryland, pointed out in remarks before the Committee 
on the Technical Basis for the Yucca Mountain Standards (a 
panel of the National Academy of Sciences) the imposition of 
risk on tribal peoples should be considered under President 
Clinton's February 11, 1994 Executive Order on Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice In Minority 
Populations and Low-lncome Populations. The threat from an 
involuntary risk must also consider the global population
vii
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impact from the radioactive gas Carbon-14, released from an 
unsaturated repository. Yucca Mountain, Nevada was the only 
unsaturated site considered in the nation as a high-level 
nuclear waste repository. It failed to meet the standard for 
radiation in the air set by the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency. Congress has sent the issue to the 
National Academy of Sciences, in an effort to force an 
acceptable standard for Yucca Mountain, which is the only 
location under consideration as a high-level nuclear waste 
repository. Furthermore, any radiological safety standard, in 
regard to involuntary risk, must also consider future 
generations, who will inherit the waste residues. (Makhijani, 
Dr. K.S. Shrader-Frechette).
Since Nevada is a state, it enjoys certain sovereign 
rights under the U.S. Constitution. Congress established a 
veto for a state chosen as the site of a high-level nuclear 
waste repository in the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982. That veto remained intact in the 1987 Amendments, but 
it is considered by political experts easy to override with a 
two-thirds vote of Congress. That raises a second moral 
issue, the limited participation in the decision-making 
process by the State of Nevada. The financial benefits are 
capped in the Amendments, thus appearing more a bribe than an 
incentive.
In 1990 the State of Nevada sued then-Energy Secretary 
James Watkins. The heart of Nevada's argument was that
viii
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Congress did not have constitutional authority to enact the 
1987 NWPA Amendments, which created a conflict between the 
Property Clause and the Tenth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit 
rejected Nevada's argument, because Yucca Mountain is on 
federal land. However, the Ninth Circuit did recognize that 
the federal government's authority is limited (Ninth Circuit 
Court decision, 1991). The heart of Nevada's argument rests 
in the Tenth Amendment, since the court rejected the state's 
five other arguments, including Equal Footing. The state's 
claim lies in the policy process, since Nevada was singled 
out in the 1987 Amendments to accept a burden from forty-nine 
other states. The federal government assumes all accidents 
or externalities will only occur on federal land, i.e., the 
Yucca Mountain site. Aside from the safety issues, Nevada 
will bear both socio-economic and psychic burdens of having 
the repository within its borders, and it will suffer these 
risks involuntarily.
The third issue centers on the argument made by the 
federal government that a high-level nuclear waste repository 
solves the problem for future generations. This is neither 
ethical nor moral. That claim ignores future advances in 
technology, future use of the so-called ''wastes'' for 
beneficial purposes, and future threats to the environment 
from the buried radioactive materials. (Shrader-Frechette) 
The issues that Nevada has raised so far pose a legitimate 
question as to the scientific process through which Yucca
ix
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Mountain was chosen and the coercion federal officials and 
agencies applied to the state itself. Former DOE geologist 
Jerry Szymanski criticized the site as flawed because it 
could allow upwelling water deep in the Earth to enter the 
repository. A June 29, 1992 earthquake at Little Skull
Mountain, about ten miles from Yucca Mountain, raised further 
scientific questions about the safety of the site. And the 
U.S. Geological Survey has discovered major earthquake 
faults, namely, the Ghost Dance and Sundance fault zones, 
crisscrossing the repository site. At this time the safety 
issue has not been resolved either scientifically, or to the 
satisfaction of a skeptical public.
In the management of nuclear wastes. Congress turned a 
scientific process into a politically risky decision that has 
not and cannot be proven sound. In addition, the public does 
not trust the Department of Energy, either those living in 
Nevada or in other states. The Ninth Circuit Court decision 
did not claim that Yucca Mountain was good for a repository, 
merely that the federal government had the right to be in 
Nevada to study the site.
To acknowledge those who have been thoughtful enough to 
contribute and comment on this work, I wish to begin by 
recognizing the Greenspun family —  Barbara, Brian, and Danny 
—  who so generously allowed me to pursue this subject at a 
depth unheard of in modern journalism; former Governor Mike 
0'Callaghan, who kept my resolve intact; Dr. Hal Rothman, Dr.
X
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Dina Titus and Dr. Richard Soule, who nursed the author and 
the chapters through each revision; James Flynn; Roger 
Kasperson; Paul Slovic; Kai Erikson; Donald Weigel; Dr. K. 
Shrader-Frechette; Dr. Alan Zundel, all of whom gave so 
generously of their time, and Dr. Craig Walton, the mentor 
who helped give the words wings, and last, but by no means 
least, my long-suffering and always loving family.
Mary Manning Whitaker 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
May 1995
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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION
Although the United States has recognized the problem of 
containing, storing, and disposing of nuclear wastes since 
the mid-1950s, it was not until the 1980s that Congress chose 
to act on a final solution to its radioactive enigma. First, 
elected officials outlined an avenue for low-level 
radioactive wastes, most produced by hospitals, universities, 
laboratories and, to a lesser extent, from nuclear power 
reactors, by passing the Low-Level Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
during 1980. Then two years later the Congress proposed the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act based on deep geological disposal 
for the most radioactive substances produced during nuclear 
power generation, spent fuel rods. Yet, as this thesis 
attempts to discover, thirty years after the federal 
government began to consider solving the problem of nuclear 
wastes, progress has faltered in a quagmire of politics, 
bureaucratic bungling, overwhelming costs, and science 
engineered by the abuse of the political process. After the 
1987 Amendments were approved by Congress, the democratic 
principles and the usual accompanying struggle to reach a
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decision evident in the 1982 Act had been cast aside. While 
the issue appears to be pragmatic and utilitarian on the 
surface, our nuclear waste management policy has failed 
because the Congressional process ignored fundamental moral 
and ethical principles, namely, discourse, equity, and human 
rights.
Current federal actions taken for the management of 
high-level nuclear waste have failed since the demise of the 
1982 Act. These actions can be considered a failure because 
they have been plagued by public opposition, conflict between 
branches of government, poor management, unanswered 
scientific questions and concerns, and exorbitant costs. 
Congress believed the entire process of characterizing three 
sites, two at federal installations existing for nuclear 
weapons development, could be accomplished for less than $1 
billion per site. By 1987 the DoE's program managers 
estimated spending nearly $2 billion per site. To date, the 
DoE has spent $3 billion on Yucca Mountain alone, and 
estimates it will cost more than $6 billion to decide if it 
is suitable. As this thesis and other critics are attempting 
to explain, there are problems with the program from the 
beginning which never were resolved.
When Congress enacted the 1987 Amendments, there was no 
time provided to consult with Nevada, the state in which the 
Yucca Mountain site is located, or with the public at large 
who will live with trucks and trains loaded with spent
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nuclear fuel passing their homes and businesses for more than 
thirty years, if Yucca Mountain in Southern Nevada is 
declared suitable. The 1987 Amendments were passed by 
Congress as part of an essential omnibus bill at the very end 
of the session. Nevada senators and representatives did not 
have the political power or the time to stop a major piece of 
legislation, namely the nation's budget, at the time the 
Amendments were tacked on to the bill. There were no public 
hearings or extensive public debate in the usual manner of 
major legislation. The Amendments, in addition to narrowing 
investigation to one site, canceled a search for an interim 
storage facility and a second repository site in the eastern 
states under the "geographical equity'' contained in the 
1982 Act.
The Yucca Mountain program is a troubling and high-risk 
effort if one views it in the most optimistic light. " T h e  
federal government is gambling that the tuff mountain, 90 
miles northwest of Las Vegas, will be suitable,'' (1) and 
then accepted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which 
must license the facility. Although it is possible the DoE 
will be successful, serious problems stand in the way of 
progress toward opening a repository under the current 
process and there is no alternative site for the federal 
government to develop in case Yucca Mountain fails. Since the 
U.S. Department of Energy has no backup plan, it must return 
to Congress for new instructions on managing nuclear waste if
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Yucca Mountain fails. Taking a practical view and a recent 
glance at the history of U.S. nuclear waste management, this 
would mean starting over, a process that could take several 
decades as another site is chosen, studied, and developed 
with no guarantee under the present system that there will be 
less public opposition. Certainly, if Yucca Mountain fails, 
there will be even more reason for the public to distrust the 
DoE, other federal agencies involved with nuclear waste 
management, and the nuclear industry itself.
State of Nevada officials and others have believed that 
the DOE and its allies in the nuclear energy industry and 
Congress will force the state to accept a high-level nuclear 
waste facility at Yucca Mountain, although state residents 
are overwhelmingly opposed to it. Even if this strategy 
works, and a repository or monitored retrievable storage 
facility is located at Yucca Mountain, there is a trail of 
evidence [scientific, economic and ethical] that the public 
policy has been a failure. How could such a program be 
considered successful if: 1) A repository was built at
excessive cost to both ratepayers and taxpayers (through use 
of defense funds); 2) After a long and bitter struggle 
between governments at all levels; 3) In opposition to 
community, state, and public values for a fair and equitable 
process and outcome, rather than with a volunteer site; 4) If 
a special set of environmental, health and safety rules had 
to be improvised or ignored to uniquely qualify a site that
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otherwise would be disqualified; and 5) With public trust 
eroded in federal government's management of technological 
hazards based on this example? These are the major concerns 
of this thesis and of such critics as the General Accounting 
Office, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and independent 
consultants working for and independently of the State of 
Nevada.
Since the first nuclear weapon exploded in New Mexico's 
desert on July 16, 1945, the federal government has claimed 
the exclusive right to regulate radioactive activities, 
especially nuclear wastes. With its long and exclusive 
history in nuclear weapons production, testing, nuclear power 
generation and radioactive waste management, the federal 
government can be viewed as the major player in attempting to 
build a high-level nuclear waste facility. In contrast, 
whenever the question of a site for such a facility has been 
raised, affected states and communities have opposed all 
efforts adamantly. State and local opposition is based on 
public opinion, perceptions, and attitudes in deep opposition 
to living, or even visiting, near a radioactive waste 
facility, especially a repository.
The heart of the public policy problem in nuclear waste 
management lies in the inherent opposition by the public, 
state governments, and local communities to the federal 
approach imposed upon them. That opposition is based on a 
number of legitimate concerns, especially risk assignment.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
They include controlling health and environmental hazards 
from radiation exposure; distrust of the DoE, as well as 
other federal agencies assigned to regulatory oversight, the 
nuclear power industry, and the Congress; and a belief that 
project proponents are unwilling to address a range of 
potentially serious socioeconomic impacts, such as the stigma 
a host area [Nevada as wasteland] would bear by becoming the 
nation's nuclear waste repository, or even by becoming a 
corridor for shipments of nuclear waste for more than thirty 
years, (the length of time the proposed repository will be 
able to accept high-level nuclear wastes).
Resistance to the federal government's approach to 
nuclear waste management began almost as soon as the ink had 
dried on the Act, signed into law by President Reagan on 
January 7, 1983. The law created the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), which by 1987 had lost 
the public's faith and trust due to a number of reasons. For 
example, potential first round states were located mostly in 
the West, and were limited to those already under 
investigation by the DoE. They were included in the original 
Act to meet a demanding and optimistic schedule to complete 
the first repository by 1998. In May 1986 the DoE winnowed 
the sites to Nevada, Washington, and Texas for formal site 
characterization. Three possible sites in Tennessee were 
identified for a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) 
facility. The second-round eastern sites included preliminary
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
identification of 235 sites with an eventual narrowing to 20 
locations in seven states: Wisconsin, Minnesota, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina.
These three elements —  how the first-round sites, the 
MRS sites, and the second-round sites were selected —  were 
opposed by the states and the public. The final three sites 
selected for the first-round repository concentrated this 
criticism and focused it on the DoE decision-making process. 
Two House subcommittees discovered several documents from the 
DoE files, including draft DoE methodology reports and the 
energy secretary's recommendation to the president. After 
review, subcommittee leaders wrote to Secretary of Energy 
John S. Herrington, accusing the DoE of manipulating data and 
analytic techniques leading to a "predetermined set of 
sites,'' and "tailored the methodology report to justify the 
final decision.'' (2) Herrington denied any manipulation.
In early 1986, about 18,000 people attended public 
briefings and hearings on the second-round sites, and more 
than 60,000 comments were offered to the DoE for review. 
Congressional office holders from the seven second-round 
states running for re-election in 1986 felt threatened by 
association with the second-round selection process. DoE 
suspended further work on these sites in May 1986, explaining 
that revised and lower forecasts for high-level nuclear 
wastes meant that a second repository could be delayed. The 
head of the OCRWM said that politics was not a part of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8decision. (3) But internal DoE documents specifically 
identified immediate political relief'' as an important 
benefit of ending the second-round site work, so it appears 
there was duplicity from the start.
The widespread failure of relations between federal and 
state governments emerged during these early years of the 
program. States filed numerous lawsuits against the program. 
This legal barrage in the courts was followed by more suits 
filed by public advocacy, community-based, and industry 
groups. In 1986 the U.S. General Accounting Office began to 
include a listing of legal actions with subsections in its 
quarterly reports to Congress. At one point more than 2 0 
cases were active. (4)
A number of other problems surfaced by 1987. The DoE's 
management and administration of the program was widely 
considered to be inadequate. The OCRWM reorganized in July 
1984, and continued top level changes in September 1985, 
according to the GAO quarterly reports, reassigning 
responsibilities and revising administrative lines of 
reporting. The organization continued changing in 1986 and 
1987. The GAO reported that the reason for the slow progress 
was that program officials said they had a difficult time 
hiring personnel meeting quality standards, partly blaming it 
on the non-competitive federal salary schedule.
Then the DoE's schedules began to slip. The Mission 
Plan, intended as the guide for the entire program, was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
delayed from August 1984 to July 1985. By April 30, 1985, 
President Reagan followed a DoE recommendation and exercised 
an option to combine defense high-level nuclear wastes with 
those from civilian nuclear power reactors as part of the 
OCRWM program. In effect, by putting all U.S. nuclear eggs in 
one basket, this action put the program into isolation as 
the lone avenue for solving the high-level radioactive waste 
problem. Combining waste streams makes sense because the DoE 
is responsible for both defense and commercial wastes, and it 
focused the federal agency on a single program, instead of 
two separate directions, both time- and cost-consuming. The 
combination did compound the problem because some defense 
wastes are liquid and must be treated and solidified before 
geological burial can take place. In addition, complexity 
reigned in the DoE's nuclear waste management program. 
Besides a lack of flexibility of scientific alternatives to 
disposing of the radioactive materials, there was no 
provision for exploration of alternative sites or methods for 
storage and disposal.
However, in the public mind, the weapons' radioactive 
waste linked with commercial nuclear spent fuel rods left a 
poor impression as past practices at government weapons 
installations across the country became sensational 
headlines. Hanford, Washington. Fernald, Ohio. Nevada Test 
Site. Rocky Flats, Colorado. Savannah River, S.C. Detailed 
news accounts following radioactive releases, deliberate and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accidental, during the Cold War were uncovered by "'Tiger 
Team'' experts sent in by then Energy Secretary Retired 
Admiral James Watkins. The media focus on the secrecy of the 
events and the poor handling of radioactive, hazardous and 
toxic liquids, solids, and dust at the facilities eroded 
public confidence further, damaging the DoE's claims that it 
provided the most technically advanced means to manage all 
things radioactive.
Then the issue of quality assurance emerged as a major 
stumbling block to the way the DoE was overseeing its 
contractor work. The NRG warned the DoE in 1985 that its 
quality assurance plan did not meet regulatory requirements, 
followed by warnings in 1986 and 1988, according to the GAO 
reports. By 1987 the DoE had issued stop-work orders to its 
major contractors, such as the national laboratories, the 
U.S. Geological Survey and private managers and consulting 
companies. The DoE then rescheduled opening its first 
repository from 1998 to a target date for initiating 
operations in 2003 and full operations by 2008. The original 
optimistic repository schedule had been approved by Congress 
in the 1982 Act, so rescheduling the opening indicated 
another DoE management failure. It also underscored the DoE's 
pending failure to accept high-level nuclear wastes in 1998, 
based on the 1982 Act and contracts the agency had signed 
with nuclear utilities in 1985. The DoE had also failed other 
mandates within the Act, such as negotiating cooperation and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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consultation agreements with potential host states. These 
contracts have never been negotiated.
The DoE also faced other problems, such as the states' 
role in program oversight and decision processes, written 
into the original Act by Congress. The steps desired by 
Congress were written vaguely and have remained vague. The 
GAO report for 1987 minimized the DoE's decision to abandon 
the search for a second eastern repository site, but in the 
midst of elections, this decision appeared to protect the 
political interests of populous eastern states under 
consideration as repositories, while treating states in the 
West as colonies. This particular decision clearly angered 
political leaders in the three western states with sites 
selected in the first round for study.
The DoE alone cannot be blamed for its limitations, 
culture, history, and public reputation. The real failure of 
the nation's nuclear waste management is rooted in 
congressional policy that failed to approach its task with a 
realistic schedule, experimental science, sensitivity for 
public opinion, failure to realize the public's hostility to 
the DoE's roots in secret nuclear weapons development, and 
the limits imposed by such widespread opposition in a 
democratic form of government.
The first failure of the original policy decision in 
1982 is the lack of authority provided to states, tribes, and 
other major players to participate in major program
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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decisions. While Congress mentioned these participants in the 
Act, it failed to relinquish any decision-making role to 
other than federal authorities or propose a clear-cut avenue 
of participation for affected parties. Those authorities 
included Congress, the DoE, the EPA, and the NRG, but do not 
include affected parties such as sited states, corridor 
states, communities or Indian tribes. While the state 
selected as a permanent repository site has a veto, its 
exercise is an act of frustration for a sited state, since 
the veto can be overcome with a two-thirds majority vote of 
the Congress. Thus, the final decision, it was clear after 
the Amendments were passed, rested with Congress.
Second, Congressional representatives from the beginning 
relied on an optimistic and unrealistic schedule to 
accomplish a task to solve a problem that was three decades 
old when faced. Scientific studies, in the case of a project 
such as a high-level nuclear waste repository, are 
experimental at best and filled with uncertainties. The 
Congress chose to ignore the scientific process with its 
uncertainties inherent in such experiments for expediency and 
a political solution to an ongoing problem which will not 
disappear in a political lifetime, or in most lifetimes of 
existing nations.
Third, the Congress misread the public's opposition to 
its mandate for the DoE to manage the high level nuclear 
waste program. Representatives believed the public would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accept the original law, but when it failed by 1987, the 
Congress then chose to ignore a solution, namely, an in-depth 
review to examine the experiences of successful opposition by 
first-round and second-round states selected, as well as 
those opposing the MRS project. By failing to address its 
own weaknesses, strengths, and mistakes in formulating the 
original Act, Congress perpetuated its errors in judgment.
Not everyone balked at a second opportunity to revisit 
the first policy and write a new law when 1987 came. 
Representative Morris Udall of Arizona proposed a moratorium 
on the repository program and a thorough policy review by 
Congress. By halting the program for eighteen months to two 
years, a significant delay in finding a solution for nuclear 
waste loomed. On the other hand, by modifying the 1982 Act in 
some way, the program could be resurrected without delay. 
Senator J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, author of the 1987 
Amendments, chose the second approach. Since Nevada is a 
politically weak state, with less clout than either 
Washington or Texas, selecting Yucca Mountain as the lone 
study site was not surprising. Congressional members such as 
Johnston also believed Nevada residents would be easier to 
convert than those of other states because of the thirty-year 
history of nuclear weapons experiments at the Nevada Test 
Site.
A most important change brought by the proposed 
Amendments to U.S. nuclear waste policy was the selection of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
Yucca Mountain as the single study site. By terminating all 
work at Hanford, Washington and Deaf Smith County, Texas, 
Congress instructed the DoE to return for further directions 
only if the Nevada site fails. A second repository east of 
the Mississippi River was also canceled, neutralizing the 
political opposition from midwestern, southeastern and 
northeastern states. Interim storage, namely a Monitored 
Retrievable storage (MRS) facility in Tennessee was also 
eliminated, although the state had lost a court decision 
against it and the Oak Ridge community, a major national 
nuclear weapons facility, supported the temporary MRS. An MRS 
could be revived only after the President approved a site for 
developing the permanent repository. Under the Amendments, 
Nevada could not be considered as an interim storage site, 
since it was the major permanent repository study area.
The Amendments endorsed the DoE as the agency in charge 
of nuclear waste management, clearly weakening efforts for 
cooperation and consultation with Nevada. The Amendments 
offered participation and funding to '"affected units of 
government,'' which include Nye County, where the site is 
located, as well as nine contiguous counties, including Clark 
County where the largest population in Nevada is located, and 
Inyo County in California, which could become affected by 
contaminated ground water. While the Amendments force Nevada 
to accept the site. Congress agreed to a voluntary program 
for the MRS, setting up an Office of the Nuclear Waste
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Negotiator to find a willing host state or Indian Tribe. The 
idea was proposed by Udall.
The Congress also initiated the Nuclear Waste Technical 
Review Board, a group of scientists and engineers selected to 
evaluate the technical and scientific validity of the DoE's 
activities. Since its creation, the Board has raised 
criticisms of the process, similar to the GAO's and the NRC's 
reports, but has no authority to declare the site unsuitable. 
All of these review panels have recommended independent 
studies and examinations of the nuclear waste management 
program since the Amendments were passed in 1987.
By eliminating plans for a second repository, the 
congressional actions in the Amendments effectively ignored 
fairness and equity, cooperation and consultation with the 
state, public opposition and participation in the debate, 
scientific risk and uncertainty, other waste management 
options, and endorsed the DoE while its own management 
problems and relations with other agencies mounted. Rather 
than enabling the nation to solve its nuclear waste problems 
on a sound basis with public trust. Congress had become the 
creator of a program plagued with flaws and problems from the 
start. " I n  retrospect, the NWPAA (Nulcear Waste Policy Act 
Amendments) was not a solution to the HLNW (High Level 
Nuclear Waste) program problems but merely a prolongation of 
an obsolete and historically failed approach.'' (5).
Nevada's opposition, once subdued before the Amendments
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became law, escalated in a fusilade of legislative and legal 
actions. Before Congress enacted the Amendments, the court 
cases filed by the state requested judicial review of program 
decisions by the DoE which Nevada considered failing to 
conform with the original Act or restricted Nevada's right to 
participate fully in the site characterization process, 
according to Harry Swainston, Nevada's Deputy Attorney 
General. Once the fairness of the process and the equitable 
outcome had been abandoned from the original Act, the 
Amendments were labeled the "Screw Nevada Bill'' by those 
sympathetic to the state, from the public to the press.
The Nevada Legislature joined in escalating the 
opposition once the Amendments became law by passing Assembly 
Joint Resolutions (AJR) 4 and 6. AJR 4 stated "adamant 
opposition'' to placing a high-level nuclear waste repository 
in the state and AJR 6 banned the federal government from 
establishing a repository within the state without the 
consent of the Legislature. This action was a reversal of 
the Legislature's prior endorsement of the Nevada Test Site 
when the state was chosen as the nation's nuclear weapons 
proving ground in 1951. Both resolutions passed the Nevada 
Legislature on April 6, 1989, and were sent to the president, 
the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives on 
April 19, 1989.
However, the state Legislature proceeded one step 
further. On June 28, 1989, the Nevada Legislature passed
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Assembly Bill 222, making it illegal for any person or 
government entity to store high-level radioactive waste in 
Nevada. The governor signed the bill into law on July 6, 
1989.
In addition. Congress continued its failed nuclear waste 
management strategy by abandoning fairness and equity, and 
betting the entire nation's nuclear waste program on one 
site. This all-eggs-in-one-basket approach has been 
criticized by utility representatives and DoE officials alike 
(6). The state has regulatory authority not defined under 
the U.S. Constitution, such as its lands, state routes, 
employment regulations and its laws regulating the health and 
safety of its citizens. While a federal court could strike 
down each of the state's arguments, the legal process could 
take years and delay the opening of a permanent repository at 
Yucca Mountain.
An example of how the state can delay the DoE has 
already occurred. After the state Legislature passed the two 
resolutions (AJR 4 and AJR 6), and Assembly Bill 222, 
Governor Miller requested an opinion from the Nevada attorney 
general on the status of environmental permits requested for 
the Yucca Mountain project by the DoE. The governor said he 
believed the two legislative resolutions were a valid and 
effective notice of disapproval under the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act (Section 116 (b)), since Congress had chosen Yucca 
Mountain as the single potential high level nuclear waste
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repository site. The Act gives Congress 90 days to override a 
state veto in order to select the final repository site. On 
November 1, 1989 the attorney general advised the governor 
that the state's legislative actions and the failure of 
Congress to override the veto meant that the repository had 
been disapproved for Yucca Mountain and environmental permits 
for DoE were unnecessary.
Once the governor had the opinion in hand, he ordered 
relevant state agencies to stop any work on permit requests 
and to return DoE's applications without further actions. 
While the first lawsuit was filed in 1985 and the latest in 
1994, the state's action illustrates how difficult it will be 
for the federal government to build a repository in an 
unwilling state, even one as politically weak as Nevada. 
Although Nevada lost its judicial review of the DoE refusal 
to recognize Nevada's disapproval of Yucca Mountain and its 
failure to stop site characterization work, it took three 
years for the final decision because of a series of appeals 
filed by the state. Once the U.S. Supreme Court denied a 
hearing after the Appeals Court decided against the state, 
Nevada agencies began processing environmental permits.
The DoE once again went on the offensive, declaring 
Nevada's legal maneuvers were delaying tactics under a 
" scorched-earth battle plan.'' (7). After DoE testimony 
before the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, 
the administration moved to strip Nevada of issuing
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licensing, permits, and regulatory control over the federal 
site characterization of Yucca Mountain. These provisions 
were contained in the National Energy Strategy Bill, Subtitle 
B of Title V. However, this power play was removed from the 
energy bill before passage due to the state's processing of 
permits for DoE, and the fact that it was unclear whether 
Nevada caused the delays or whether DoE managers, funding, 
and administrative decisions had contributed substantially 
to the slowing of the project (GAO May 1992). Further, a 
Nevada senator threatened a filibuster at a crucial time in 
the legislative process unless the offensive sections 
canceling the state's permitting authority were removed. They 
were.
The DoE had requested three permits concerning air 
pollution control and water use. The two relating to air 
pollution control were issued in July of 1991. The third, a 
water permit, was opposed by the state as an intervenor 
before a hearing conducted by the state engineer. The state's 
basis for opposing the water permit rested on having no 
unappropriated water in the source requested by the DoE ' s 
application, and the project was not in the public interest, 
a prerequisite for pumping ground water in Nevada. The 
state's argument also raised the stigma that a nuclear waste 
repository would have on a state relying on millions of 
tourists per year for its economic existence. The impacts of 
a high-level nuclear waste repository in an economy based on
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millions of visitors could have damaging effects in 
psychological, social and economic areas. Faced with 
political pressure from the Congress, the state withdrew its 
arguments and the state engineer granted available water for 
site characterization with restrictions and stipulations on 
March 3, 1992.
But water shortages at the repository are only one of 
its problems. Real scientific concerns have been raised about 
possible active earthquake faults, volcanism, rising water 
and rain water penetrating minute pores in the tuff and 
reaching the nuclear storage canisters. Former DoE scientist 
Jerry Szymanski proposed a theory that ground water could 
periodically rise inside the mountain, forced into the 
repository by a major seismic cataclysm, such as an 
earthquake.(8) After he presented his theory and it became 
public, the DoE eventually isolated Szymanski and he 
abandoned the project for work in the private sector. If 
rising water reached a repository, flooding the waste storage 
area, the canisters could break open or disintegrate, 
releasing radioactivity. A watery plume contaminated with 
radioactivity could have disastrous environmental 
consequences. (9) While there is no scientific consensus, 
subsequent research bolsters the possibility of such a 
catastrophe. (10)
Yucca Mountain's license could be halted if the 
possibility of strong earthquakes is believed relatively
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probable. DoE and state of Nevada scientists had been arguing 
about the quake potential of faults at Yucca Mountain —  and 
then an actual magnitude 5.6 temblor occurred at Little Skull 
Mountain, 12 miles from the proposed repository site, on June 
29, 1992. The DoE officials said that the earthquake
demonstrated the mountain could withstand such a disruptive 
event and protect nuclear wastes contained in a repository, 
while Robert Loux, executive director of the Nevada Nuclear 
Waste Project Office, argued it was a "wake-up call'' 
proving that Southern Nevada is geologically young and 
seismically active. Another 6.0 magnitude quake 100 miles 
west of Yucca Mountain occurring on May 17, 1993, drove the 
point further. The scientific debate also includes the Ghost 
Dance and Sundance faults which slice through the repository 
site itself, and scientists cannot agree on when the faults 
were last active. Some scientists (11) believe the two faults 
are actual seismic zones.
There is also evidence that two volcanoes, within 27 
miles of Yucca Mountain, erupted as recently as 5,000 years 
ago, suggesting volcanic activity could take place within the 
10,0 00-year time frame that the repository will remain 
dangerously radioactive. Besides catastrophic geologic 
events, human intrusion could breach the security of the 
repository. Future generations may seek fossil fuels, 
precious minerals and metals at Yucca Mountain as well. The
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DoE claims there are no mineral or petroleum resources at the 
mountain.
Then there is the potential problem of release of 
Carbon-14, a radioactive gas which will only escape from 
Yucca Mountain because it is an unsaturated rock. A 
relatively large amount of the existing carbon-14 will seep 
into the environment (12) because the gas with a half-life 
of 5,730 years will be present in significant quantities when 
the canisters disintegrate in an estimated 300 to 1,000 
years. Once a canister breaks down, the carbon-14 will 
convert to gas and reach the surface before its radioactivity 
decays to harmless levels.
The uncertainty of radiation levels at Yucca Mountain is 
so pervasive, the DoE could find it impossible to basically 
prove Yucca Mountain is suitable to become a repository. The 
National Research Council's Board on Radioactive Waste 
Management signaled the existence of several scientifically 
uncertain sources making it improbable that the DoE can prove 
radiation releases are unlikely. The DoE's own peer-reviewed 
Early Site Suitability Evaluation (ESSE) in 1992 said future 
projections of earthquake or volcanic activity besides 
natural resources '"will be fraught with substantial 
uncertainties that cannot be quanitified using standard 
statistical models.'' (13) Scientists cannot even collect 
all relevant data necessary for a license application, the
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computer model keeps evolving, and the persistent risks last 
such a long time. Such uncertainties make it virtually 
impossible to estimate the probability of releases with any 
precision covered by EPA standards or other federal 
regulations. The Congress responded in the 1982 Energy Policy 
Act, mandating a less stringent calculation of radiation 
risks at Yucca Mountain, than those proposed by the EPA. 
This approach applies only to Yucca Mountain. The Act also 
seeks to legislate the problem of human intrusion by putting 
the site in the hands of the DoE in perpetuity, although 
there is no historical evidence a society or a governmental 
institution has ever lasted that long.
In an effort to force the federal government to abandon 
the single study site, Nevada took two other legal actions 
against DoE's siting activities. In the 1994 Nevada v. 
O'Leary (94-70148; 9th Cir.), the state claims the Energy 
Department failed to adequately characterize the nature and 
origin of calcite-silica deposits at the mountain's Trench
14. The NWPA requires DoE to terminate all site 
characterization activities at any time if Yucca Mountain is 
found not suitable. The DoE does not have procedures for 
finding the site unsuitable as a result of site 
characterization studies. The state's argument says that 
DoE's decision to stop study of the possible disqualifier 
offered in Szymanski's model fails to meet appropriate site 
characterization procedures at Yucca Mountain. The action
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asks the court to establish the state's right to a credible 
scientific process. (14)
A second suit before the 9th Circuit Court also 
questions how the DoE makes its decisions and what record 
will be available. In Nevada v. O'Leary, the state has asked 
to depose 27 scientists who reviewed the Szymanski studies 
while their information is fresh and before the scope of work 
on the project changes.
Still to be tested besides scientific uncertainties are 
the constitutional questions about whether other states, 
through federal legislation, can force Nevada to host a 
repository against its will, or if the state has a sovereign 
right to protect itself, which will be considered in a 
chapter in this thesis. All of these paths are uncertain. 
While the U.S. Constitution grants the federal government 
seeming sweeping powers over individual states, the language 
also grants the states latitude in areas not specified at the 
federal level. Such areas as vital state interests, roads, 
health and safety, and environmental protection are a state's 
domain. In the case of Nevada, the state also controls its 
ground water resources in a very restrictive manner, which 
could be a problem if the DoE must draw upon the underground 
resource for repository activities.
Following this introduction, the second chapter of this 
thesis will provide detailed background on the history of how 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments became law. To do so
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requires reviewing a short history of the 1982 Act itself, 
then reviewing The Congressional Record, The Congressional 
Quaterly , newspaper clippings, and any other helpful texts 
to sketch the passage of the 1987 Amendments. As I 
discovered, the record is sketchy to non-existent. While the 
records reveal many meetings between Sen. J. Bennett 
Johnston, the Democrat from Louisiana who engineered the 1987 
Amendments and chaired the Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee, and other congressional committee 
members outside the public forum and the Senate floor, little 
or no public discussion in committee hearings took place. At 
the time, the public distrust of the DoE either had not been 
considered by the congressional representatives, or was 
considered and so mitigated by secrecy.
The third chapter will trace the progress in thought 
leading to the technological myth of the Twentieth Century. 
Historian and philosopher Lewis Mumford provided an analogy 
here. In his own works on the myth of the machine, he 
compares the atomic weapons developers to the ancient pyramid 
builders, who ignored social debate and questions of 
economics, raising their all-encompassing projects to a 
concentration of power dangerous to the society as a whole. 
This omnipotent and omniscient attitude led to the decline of 
the civilization under the pyramid builders, Mumford claims. 
In addition, there is the question of allowing experts to run 
a democratic nation. Here two engineers with very different
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viewpoints both ponder this trend. Besides Mumford, poet and 
essayist Wendell Berry and poet William Stafford contribute a 
humanizing approach in demystifying the language surrounding 
such complex problems as managing nuclear waste. Similar 
parallels between the ancient contractors and the current 
nuclear waste managers are evident: They promise jobs, 
economic security to those who work at the project, an 
everlasting solution, and prosperity for the region. Although 
this is a rather stark economic portrait, the founding of the 
United States brought into question equality and equity, 
rather than pure economics to run society. Although the 
founding fathers of the United States agreed on equity and 
believed equitable solutions involved public trust, there is 
no current way to ensure equity in the approach to nuclear 
waste management embodied in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
Amendments of 1987.
Furthermore, this third chapter outlines the premises 
(1) that relying on the technological myth —  here, that 
science can make Yucca Mountain safe for at least ten 
thousand years by engineering barriers to encapsulate the 
most radioactive substances known in history —  is a false 
premise; (2) that concerns other than scientific ones, i.e., 
social, economic, moral, and ethical, raised by Nevadans and 
others merit a place on the planning table; (3) that 
scientists should not have the sole power to formulate the 
decision on where to place the nuclear wastes; and (4) that
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the nuclear waste management process conducted by the U.S. 
government undermines and threatens the foundations from 
which this democratic nation emerged.
The attitude that high-level nuclear waste disposal is 
simply a technical problem ready for expert solutions has to 
change. Any repository has an array of social and economic, 
health and safety, environmental and human aspects that will 
drastically affect communities near the site and through 
which waste will be transported. Many critics have argued 
that the burden of the stigma borne by the repository host 
state must be relieved through strict safety standards and 
negotiated benefits packages to cover the full range of such 
long-term socio-economic effects.
The Founding Fathers attempted a balance between natural 
law and laws imposed by men to govern, a balance between 
individual rights and enough civil order to form a union of 
the separate states. Today the original intent of the 
founders is still being argued. In the case of participation 
under the democratic form of government advocated in this 
country, however, some people feel they can no longer 
attempt, and in some cases feel they cannot, participate in 
the decision-making, since the world has become so 
complicated. This view leaves only the experts who can figure 
out the technology, which is usually wrapped in a new set of 
symbols or even a new language, to search for solutions. In 
the age of uncertainty, our present problems, such as nuclear
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waste management, focus on the same dichotomies between the 
public and the private, between authority and expertise as 
the nation's founders grappled with and never believed they 
solved.
This state of affairs leads to the questions raised in 
the debate forging the Constitution of the united States. Of 
course, more than two hundred years ago no one could envision 
such a lethal risk posed by highly radioactive materials, 
which had not been discovered yet. Still the Founding Fathers 
searched for a common foundation to form the union of states 
without treading on the abilities and the freedoms of each 
individual state, and ultimately, the power to govern vested 
in the people. When Thomas Jefferson became President, he 
termed states' rights "sacred'' in his inaugural address, 
even after such a small group of men had forged a bitter 
constitutional battle to create the federal government. (15) 
Perhaps it was Jefferson's time in France, distant from the 
heat of the constitutional battle, which preserved his sense 
of the sacred intact. In recent court cases concerning 
radioactive waste, a federal judge in at least one lawsuit 
protected individual property rights to private land owners 
and held the state liable for damages from perceptions of 
risk from federal activities which infringed on a private 
owner's rights. In this case, a strip of private property 
used for a road leading to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project 
near Carlsbad, New Mexico, was seized from a rancher. This
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legal conclusion sets a dangerous precedent for Nevadans, or 
for individual states along the nuclear waste transport 
corridors, since the state could be held liable for any 
damages or dangers to the public's health and safety posed by 
an accident or perception of risk posed by the nuclear 
wastes. The case in New Mexico addressed the perception of 
risk, not actual harm. Since the perception was so strong, no 
actual harm had to exist, the court ruled. The case has been 
upheld on appeal.
The analysis in Chapter IV offers a view of some of the 
problems facing the Yucca Mountain Project if it continues on 
its present course, in contrast to possible alternative 
methods the nation might approach in solving its nuclear 
waste problem. After all, the DoE has plans to make the 
current system work, shortening scientific time to prove 
Yucca Mountain's suitability, asking for more funding for 
scientific studies, consolidating the complicated problems 
from reactor to repository, such as designing multiple- 
purpose canisters, and extending the time wastes could be 
retrieved from Yucca Mountain, in case anything goes wrong in 
the first one hundred years. Instead, others such as the 
state of Nevada and the General Accounting Office have 
requested an extensive, broad, independent review of the 
entire nuclear waste management program. In addition, the 
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, a scientific panel 
created under the 1987 Amendments, and the Nuclear
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Regulatory Commission, the licensing agency for the 
repository, have been critical of the DoE's process of site 
characterization. Although Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary 
began a financial review of the Yucca Mountain Project in 
April 1994, critics such as the state of Nevada and the GAO 
say it does not go far enough. Why? Because the basic policy 
of nuclear waste management is flawed.
In the conclusion, I suggest the outline of a series of 
steps with a direction for the United States to attempt a 
more democratic approach towards managing the nuclear waste 
problem. Included in this approach are alternative storage 
methods for the nuclear wastes, including such techniques as 
dry cask storage already approved by the NRG; the creation of 
a national energy policy, far beyond the 1992 National Energy 
Act, taking a look at the role of nuclear power and other 
alternative sources for generating electricity; and finally, 
the formation of an independent body to include scientists, 
environmentalists, state and federal representatives, Indian 
tribes, energy officials, ethics professionals, and most 
important, the public. By dealing with nuclear waste in the 
context of the future with its unintended consequences, the 
deadlines would be removed from the process, the nuclear 
waste problem would be treated as a scientific experiment, 
and the public would become part of processing a solution, 
even considering a voluntary negotiable siting procedure. By
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approaching nuclear waste management as a multi-faceted 
problem, the solution might be a more equitable one, more 
scientifically justified, and treated in a more open policy­
making manner, for all of those concerned.
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CHAPTER II
A BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WASTE LEGISLATION 
Chronology
November 1978: Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste
Management issues draft report recommending licensing and 
construction of Intermediate Scale Facilities'' for nuclear 
waste disposal.
Dec. 13, 1980: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
(P.L. 96-573, S. 2189) passes.
Dec. 20, 1982: House and Senate pass Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 (H.R. 3809, P.L. 97-425). It calls for the 
study of five sites and the building of two repositories in 
the nation, one in the west and one in the east, for deep 
geological burial of high-level nuclear waste.
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December, 1984: The Department of Energy selects three
sites —  Texas, Nevada and Washington State —  as preferred 
for site characterization for the nation's first high-level 
nuclear waste repository.
Dec. 19, 1985: Congress passes Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments (P.L. 99-240).
Jan. 16, 1986: The DOE identifies 12 additional sites in
seven states as potentially acceptable for a second 
repository.
May 28, 1986: DOE indefinitely defers'' search for
second repository site.
November, 1986: Congress passes FY 87 Continuing
Resolution (P.L. 99-500), prohibiting DOE from exploratory 
drilling at any repository site.
March, 1987: DOE submits proposal for Monitored
Retrievable Storage (MRS).
June, 1987: DOE submits amendment to the Waste
Program Mission Plan.
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June 24, 1987; House passes FY 1988 DOE appropriations
(H.R. 2700), continuing prohibition on exploratory drilling 
at any repository site.
July 15, 1987: Rep. Morris Udall, D-Ariz., introduces
H.R. 2967, establishing a Nuclear Waste Policy Review 
Commission, an Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, and 
for other purposes. Referred to more than one committee, 
eventually to joint committee.
Sept. 1, 1987: S. 1668 (Sen. Bennett Johnston, D-La.,
and Sen. James McClure, R-Idaho) report to Senate from the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (S. Rept. 100-152).
Dec. 21, 1987: Congress passes Budget Reconciliation
Act. H.R. 3543, including in Title V major revisions of 
nuclear waste program. One of the most significant changes is 
selecting Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the sole site to study 
for the nation's high-level nuclear waste repository.
1990; The National Energy Bill, proposed by President George 
Bush, is passed by Congress.
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I. History:
Forty years after scientists produced the first nuclear 
chain reaction at the University of Chicago, Congress passed 
the first legislation to specifically manage high-level 
nuclear waste as the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. During 
these four decades, first the Atomic Energy Commission, then 
the U.S. Department of Energy, conducted site-screening 
surveys and researched disposal technologies, some as exotic 
as transmutation that would reduce and convert radioactive 
wastes into less harmful material, a process as expensive and 
frustrating as the ancient alchemists' quest to turn lead 
into gold. In 1957 a panel of the National Academy of 
Sciences recommended that high-level nuclear waste could be 
buried in salt formations. It was the failure of the Lyons, 
Kansas salt bed in the 1970s that riveted the attention of 
the utilities on the problem of what to do with high-level 
radioactive reactor wastes. By the end of that decade, 
utilities clamored for federal legislation to help solve the 
spent fuel problem. In 1980, the Sierra Club announced 
radioactive waste as one of its top priorities. That same 
year Congress, led by Rep. Morris Udall, D-Ariz., introduced 
a comprehensive nuclear waste bill. The legislation did not 
pass.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
As far as the federal government's approach to nuclear 
waste management, an historical review, such as that 
undertaken by Gerald Jacob, in his 1990 book. Site Unseen:
The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste Repository, and Luther 
Carter's, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, reveal very 
little change in the way Congress or the nuclear industry 
sought a solution to such a major problem for three decades. 
The political process and its players entered veiry late into 
a search for the solution to the problem and acted as if a 
crisis had developed in finding a solution that was for years 
considered a purely technical one. After World War II, 
nuclear research and development remained a federal secret, 
preventing the commercial market from applying nuclear 
technologies. Then in 1954, President Eisenhower announced 
the Atoms for Peace Program in an address to the United 
Nations. The old 1946 Atomic Energy Act that had classified 
reactor designs —  putting a virtual federal monopoly on the 
data —  was shorn of its secrecy, to some extent. The federal 
government was forbidden to own commercial reactors. The 1954 
Act set up the federal government as subsidizer of the 
Reactor Demonstration Program, encouraging utilities to enter 
the nuclear age. The government ignored the question of 
nuclear waste disposal, since technicians believed the spent 
fuel would be reprocessed.
The utilities, however, had three key liabilities: 
accident potential, fuel costs, and waste disposal, according
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to Jacob and Carter. The federal government quashed those 
barricades through a number of actions. The Price-Anderson 
Act limited industry liability in case of a reactor accident. 
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) supplied the reactor fuel 
through the federal uranium enrichment program. The AEC also 
proposed to accept commercial spent reactor fuel for 
reprocessing, thus believing little waste would be produced. 
With these federal assurances in place, the utilities could 
begin developing nuclear power. They could ignore nuclear 
waste disposal, for the moment. Both the federal government 
and the utilities still believed in a technical fix to the 
nuclear waste problem.
Six years before the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was 
introduced, the National Waste Terminal Storage Program was 
approved by Congress. This investigation set out to explore 
underground rock masses on the Nevada Test Site, the nation's 
nuclear weapons proving ground since 1951. It was not until 
1979 that federal scientists turned their attention to Yucca
Mountain, an ancient volcano which formed tuff west of the
Test Site on parcels of land owned by the Bureau of Land
Management and the U.S. Air Force. Basalt at Hanford, Wash.,
salt in the Gulf Coast, and granite in the northeast of the 
nation had also been explored, but were later removed from 
consideration when the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act was 
amended in 1987, because of political pressure, according to 
author Luther Carter. (1)
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At the same time, the nuclear industry crumbled into 
chaos from a credibility crisis partially brought on by poor 
decision-making and confusing expertise, a threat to its 
"'perceived legitimacy'' of institutional authority, and a 
financial crisis. (2) Udall had committed to federal nuclear 
waste storage in 1977. " W e  (Congress) owe the country a 
decision to take the stuff and get it stored the best way we 
know how,'' he said. (3) President Carter reinforced that 
commitment when he refused to allow nuclear spent fuel 
reprocessing to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation that 
same year. At the same time, national economic growth slowed, 
recessions plagued the nation, and public fervor for energy 
conservation increased after the oil shortage of the early 
1970s and in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
plant accident, halting demand for new nuclear reactors.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 broke some new 
ground in procedures and powers to operate the nation's high- 
level radioactive waste program. It offered a limited veto to 
a state, once it was selected as a site by the president. It 
recognized the rights of Native Americans as sovereign 
nations. It required nuclear power customers to pay for the 
repository. It required specific site selection and 
environmental protection criteria. The first site had to be 
based on lengthy characterization studies. A Mission Plan 
required in the Act had to be drawn up by the Department of 
Energy (DoE replaced the AEC) for the repository, which then
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required Congressional review. The Act also left alone 
federal pre-emption of local and state regulations and 
supervision of nuclear waste shipments. Most important, the 
Act sought to remove politics from solving the problem of 
nuclear waste disposal, a goal expounded by Udall. (4) The 
Act allowed a potential host state the ability to oversee the 
Department of Energy, using funds paid by the nuclear 
ratepayers, at the rate of .001 cent, called a mil, collected 
on each nuclear reactor kilowatt hour. At the time the 
original Act was passed, there was little or no public input, 
as Jasanoff and Nelkin noted (5). The attempt to prevent 
politics from intruding on a technical solution to nuclear 
waste disposal fragmented attempts to define social issues 
and settle value conflicts at the time. (6)
Although Congressman James Santini of Nevada argued in 
favor of an absolute veto, (7) the Act allowed the state only 
a "notice of disapproval, ' ' or a minor role to advise and 
dissent from the decision reached after the site 
characterization studies were completed, the final 
environmental impact statement done, and the President 
recommended a site. The state had to present its reasons for 
this disapproval, but Congress had final override power.
In effect, Jacob and Carter argue in their books, the 
Act made few changes to the established nuclear power 
industry or the way business was conducted by the industry 
with the Congress at a national level. In the end, the Act
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failed to change institutional goals and processes, ignored 
procedures for mediation or negotiation with the affected 
states, and left the climate for conflict intact by seeking a 
purely technological solution that ignored political and 
public concerns such as social, geographical, or economic 
impacts. No ethical questions, such as free consent or 
responsibility to protect future generations, were raised.
The Act set the stage for the amendments which followed.
II. The 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments :
The 1987 Amendments had a profound effect on Nevada, 
since Congress ordered Yucca Mountain studied as the sole 
site for the first high-level nuclear repository. After five 
years, it was obvious to Congress that the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act of 1982 had failed. The original legislation was 
amended on the last day of the Congressional session in 1987, 
without committee hearings. The Johnston Amendments were 
packaged in the Budget Reconciliation Act, Title V, passed on 
December 21, 1987. They constitute twenty nine (29) pages in 
length. Like the Act before them, the Amendments stirred 
debate for months and brought the historical conflicts which 
nuclear waste management has fomented whenever policymakers 
have attempted to address it.
In the 1987 Amendments Act, the language explicitly 
states that the Energy Secretary is not required to consider
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the need for a repository, any alternatives to geological 
disposal, or alternate sites to Yucca Mountain in the 
environmental impact statement.(8)
Early in 1987, the Congress had imposed a moratorium on 
studies at all three existing potential repository sites in 
Texas, Washington, and Nevada. At the same time, the 
lawmakers cut off funding for the entire federal nuclear 
waste program. By then, the DoE's track record at its 110 
nuclear weapons facilities scattered nationwide had erupted 
into a political scandal for the Reagan administration. The 
widespread environmental contamination spread across the 
nation's conscience as major news outlets published and 
broadcast attempts to cover up problems by DoE officials at 
sites such as Hanford, Wash., and Rocky Flats, Colo.
The Amendments made some decisive changes, such as 
terminating the search for a second repository site in the 
eastern United States (9) in violation of the moral concept 
of geographical equity'' required by the 1982 Act. The 
Amendments also limited benefits to the State of Nevada once 
an agreement had been reached [violating economic 
equity].(10) Annual payments of $10 million per year while 
the repository was under construction would increase to $20 
million per year for the 35-year life of the repository, at 
which time it would stop accepting spent nuclear fuel and be 
permanently sealed.
The 1987 Amendments also established an Office of the
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Nuclear Waste Negotiator to accept voluntary offers by states 
or Indian tribes interested in hosting a Monitored 
Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility (11). Benefits to either 
a state or a tribe for the MRS were limited to $5 million a 
year before the facility accepted spent fuel, and $10 million 
per year as the MRS accepted shipments.(12)
A Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was also created
(13), with eleven [11] members appointed by the president 
from twenty two [22] scientific experts nominated by the 
National Academy of Sciences. This Board was alleged to be 
explicitly independent and none of its members could be an 
employee of the Department of Energy (DoE), or work for a 
contractor hired by the DoE. Each member serves a four-year 
term. The Board's function serves to review site 
characterization at Yucca Mountain and activities relating to 
packaging and shipping high-level nuclear waste or spent 
fuel. In a semi-annual report, the Board presents findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations, but it has no authority to 
terminate the Yucca Mountain site characterization study.
(14)
Under a " "Miscellaneous ' ' section of the Amendments Act,
(15) Congress set the rules for transporting nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste in packages certified by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; for notification of the state 
and local governments before shipping; and for providing 
unspecified technical assistance and Nuclear waste Fund
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monies to states for training public safety officials in case 
of accidents. The Amendments also banned any foreign 
plutonium shipments (16) by aircraft over the United States 
to another foreign country, unless the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission certified the containers by an actual drop test 
from the maximum cruising altitude, and an actual crash test 
of a cargo aircraft fully loaded with test materials.
The issue of subseabed disposal was dealt with in a 
section (17) calling for a report to Congress within 270 days 
(report due in January, 1995), after the Amendments were 
enacted, based on current knowledge, costs, international 
aspects, environmental, health and safety considerations. An 
Office of Subseabed Disposal Research was created under the 
Office of Energy Research of the DoE. A university-based 
Subseabed Consortium was also established. In the subseabed 
report, scientists said international treaties, the law of 
the sea and costs outweighed such disposal as an alternative.
Dry cask storage (18) was also included for study and 
evaluation until such a time as the permanent geological 
repository was built and operating. The costs, risks to human 
health and the environment, and comments from the states and 
the public on dry cask storage were included in the 
considerations under the management of the Energy Department. 
The Energy Secretary also has to examine the money available 
in the Nuclear Waste Fund that can be applied to dry cask 
storage. (19)
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III. Analysis;
The problems with amending the 1982 Act became 
compounded as the Congress learned of missing or hidden 
information. For example, Congressmen Ron Wyden of Oregon and 
Al Swift of Washington launched a General Accounting Office 
(GAO) investigation after learning of charges that the DoE's 
chief contractor at Hanford hid information of groundwater 
contamination that could drop the site from further study as 
a nuclear waste repository. An earlier DoE Inspector 
General's report had concluded there was insufficient 
evidence to support such charges.(20)
The DoE also had failed to win NRC approval of its Yucca 
Mountain site characterization quality assurance programs. A 
GAO report blamed the Energy Department itself, not the State 
of Nevada, for delaying progress at Yucca Mountain. By the 
time Congress reopened the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987, 
it was tempted to shut down the entire federal nuclear waste 
disposal program. Rep. Morris Udall, the Arizona Democrat 
considered the father of the original Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act, told the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations on June 30, 1987, that '"the program was in 
ruins'' and called on Congress to go back to square one to 
solve the problem (21).
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Two competing proposals for solving the nuclear waste 
program's morass were proposed. Udall approached the solution 
from a fresh start perspective. He called for a halt to all 
DoE site-specific activities at the three candidate sites 
(Nevada, Texas, and Washington) for a period of eighteen [18] 
months. Then he proposed establishing a special commission 
to study the DoE's program and recommend necessary changes 
and redirection. Finally, he proposed an Office of Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator to attempt a voluntary agreement with a 
state or an Indian tribe for an acceptable site for nuclear 
waste disposal characterization studies.
The Interior Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, 
chaired by Udall, approved an amended Udall bill by voice 
vote on Oct. 20 with a new number; HR 2967. Rep. Barbara 
Vucanovich, R-Nev., tacked on two amendments that lengthened 
a study commission's study period from six months to 12 
months, and gave federal aid to state and local goverments 
affected by site characterization. The committee also 
expanded the new commission's scope to include past DoE 
decisions and was offered by Rep. Wayne Owens, D-Utah, and 
supported by the finalist states. The commission would also 
study whether DoE should continue to run the nuclear waste 
program and was approved as HR 2967 on a voice vote Oct. 28 
and was reported as H. Rept. 100-425, Part 1 on Nov. 5.
Simultaneously, Senators J. Bennett Johnston, a 
Louisiana Democrat, and James McClure, a Republican from
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Idaho, introduced legislation that selected a single site —  
Yucca Mountain, Nevada —  for the DoE's concentrated study.
If the chosen site proved unsuitable, another one would be 
selected and "characterized'' by the DoE from the other two 
locations then under scrutiny. The bill also included 
financial incentives to a state or Indian tribe accepting a 
temporary, or monitored retrievable storage facility, if 
opposition to the federal selection was surrendered. The 
Johnston-McClure proposal also stopped the search for a 
second repository in the eastern United States.
Congress dragged on with its routine business throughout 
1987 without reaching a compromise on amending the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act. The negotiations ended up in the 
Appropriations Committee, because Congress decided to keep 
control of the Nuclear Waste Fund's expenditures on an annual 
basis. By Dec. 17, 1987, House and Senate negotiators had 
agreed to put the nation's high-level nuclear waste study at 
Yucca Mountain over the loud protests of Nevada, its 
congressional delegation and state officials (22). Johnston 
narrowed the scope of the repository search in a three-step 
process to produce a written law.
First, the Louisiana senator won Energy Committee 
approval for the Amendments as free-standing legislation in
S. 1668 on July 29 in a 7-2 vote in the Energy Commitee.
Here, he was opposed by Sen. Chic Hecht, R-Nev., who appeared 
to waiver on the issue of nuclear waste disposal earlier.
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Second, he successfully attached it to the fiscal 1988 
deficit-reduction law, over the vigorous objections of some 
House members, who did not believe settling the waste 
question was appropriate for a budget bill. It passed votes 
on Sept. 1 and 15, 1987. Third, He tacked his creation to the 
fiscal 1988 appropriations bill (H.R. 2700) for energy and 
water development. (23)
Johnston's motivation to trim the scope of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act was as a money-saver and to speed up the 
process of characterizing a site. He estimated characterizing 
a single site would save $634 million over three years ($139 
million in fiscal 1988, $248 million in 1989 and $247 million 
in 1990). At the same time, the Energy Committee was hunting 
for a $730 million savings to meet its three-year 
reconciliation target. The narrower focus on nuclear waste 
site characterization filled the bill. (24) Johnston also 
offered benefits to Nevada, if it would give up its battle 
against the nuclear repository at Yucca Mountain, with $10 
million a year proposed until the repository opened, and $20 
million after it began operating. (25)
Nevada's Sen. Harry Reid was not helpless, however, when 
the legislative battle moved the energy and water 
appropriations bill to the Senate floor on Nov. 4, 1987. Reid 
launched a filibuster, calling the selection of Yucca 
Mountain "wrong'' and "unfair,'' and naming it "The Screw 
Nevada'' bill. Joined by Brock Adams, D-Wash., Reid managed a
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Strong vote on a test Nov. 1. There, the Senate voted 55-30 
to table, or kill, an Adams amendment that would have struck 
Johnston's nuclear waste language from the bill. (26) But 
Johnston struck a separate deal with Sen. Jim Sasser, D- 
Tenn., to keep a temporary waste site out of his state for 
two years, according to an aide. (27) Sasser had aligned 
himself with Reid in a Sept. 15 Appropriations Committee 
markup, but struck out on his own when the two men failed to 
stop Johnston's plan.
Reid and Adams wrangled over the appropriations bill for 
three weeks. Reid argued that Johnston wanted the matter on 
the appropriations bill, because when it went to House 
conference, Johnston would be head to head with 
Appropriations Chairman Jamie L. Whitten, D-Miss., and Energy 
and Water Subcommittee Chairman Tom Bevill, D-Ala., both 
friendly to nuclear power. (28) While Adams urged nuclear 
waste in a separate bill, he agreed to limit debate if 
Johnston's plan was part of reconciliation. That way, two 
authorizing committees with different proposals, had seats at 
the negotiations. (29)
Both sides reached agreement Nov. 10, allowing a clear 
vote on a number of nuclear issues in exchange for a delay in 
the bill's final passage until Nov. 18. A key element was a 
separate vote on whether the nuclear waste plan belonged in 
the bill. Johnston won that vote, 63-30. (30) Another key 
vote on an amendment offered by Reid to make public health
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and safety foremost in considering site choice for an 
exploratory shaft was rejected by the Senate, 37-56. (31)
Sen. John B. Breaux, D-La., demolished the final hurdle to 
resubmit the bill to the Appropriations Committee with 
instructions to add the nuclear waste provisions favored by 
the Environment Committee. That vote was 34-61 (32). The 
Senate then passed the bill by a vote of 86-9.
(33)
However, conferees could not reach agreement on HR 2700, 
because of continued opposition by Reid and House members, so 
the bill was added to the Omnibus Budget Act (H.J. Res. 395 - 
- PL 100-202) that the Senate eventually passed in December. 
Since Johnston's plan was part of both the reconciliation 
bill and the omnibus spending bill, and both measures went to 
conference in the waning days of the session, a set of
conferees had to be selected to make the decision. The
warring parties agreed reconciliation conferees would study 
it first, but if that failed, the decision went back to the
spending bill side. The House and Senate differed to such a
degree that some conferees had little hope for a compromise.
( 34) Texans in the House Energy Committee moved that bill 
closer to Johnston's proposal with Republican Jack Fields 
leading the way. The Texans got their state off the table, 
because Texas and Washington sites were both located over 
aquifers. By contrast. Yucca Mountain, it was claimed, lies 
in an unsaturated zone. And, five of 21 members of the House
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Energy and Power Subcommittee were Texans. No one from Nevada 
served on the committee. Even Washington's Swift could not 
stop the momentum by Dec. 14. Thus, the House conferees 
offered the Senate a new position, choosing Nevada for the 
first and only exploratory shaft site. But Johnston's MRS 
proposal was ignored. (35)
The Senate counter-offered on Dec. 15 with the MRS 
included. The conferees screeched to another impasse. Then, 
at 2 p.m. on Dec. 16, House Speaker Jim Wright, D-Texas,
Udall, John Dingell, D-Mich., Rules Committee member Butler 
Derrick, D-S.C., and other House conferees met to win 
Wright's assurances that they would get a floor vote to 
substitute their own language for any Johnston provision with 
which they disagreed. (36) The showdown was shared with 
Johnston. At that point, the Louisiana senator did not want 
to face Dingell, Udall, Wright and Majority Leader Thomas 
Foley, D-Wash., whose states would be let off the hook by the 
House proposal. Johnston compromised on the MRS, with 
conditional authorization, and paved the way for passage.
IV. Evaluation:
To Texas and Washington, with larger populations than 
Nevada, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments were a clear 
victory. The Hanford, Wash., site and the Deaf Smith County, 
Texas location had been removed from the repository study
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list. For Nevada, it was a definite blow to the state's 
political fight to keep the search for a nuclear waste 
repository out of its borders and above politics and on a 
scientific basis. As Washington's Swift said after the House 
voted, the plan was " a  goddamned outrage.'' (37) In the end, 
however. Swift voted to protect his constituents by voting in 
favor of Johnston's plan.
The State of Nevada has also avoided any hint of 
negotiating for benefits from the DoE's site characterization 
at Yucca Mountain. In 1989 the Nevada Legislature voted 
against storing high-level nuclear waste within the state's 
borders (AB 222). In the 1993 session, the Legislature voted 
by a 2-1 margin against opening negotiations with the federal 
government for such benefits. Unless there is a major shift 
in Nevada's political climate, state officials remain 
adamantly opposed to the Yucca Mountain project and unwilling 
to negotiate for benefits.
Perhaps the morass nuclear waste legislation has reached 
can be explained by the way the policy-makers —  in this 
case, the politicians —  approached a solution. The case of 
nuclear power reactors was explored by policy analysts Brewer 
and deLeon, who rejected both incremental solutions favored 
by Lindblom and the piecemeal approach. Instead, complex 
problems, they said, require more intense, theoretical 
approaches. Especially helpful were the comments under 
"Political Science,'' where they address the problem of
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nuclear issues specifically. Both incremental and piecemeal 
categories should be avoided in the case of large-scale and 
time-bound endeavors, the authors said. Complex problems have 
many parts and different institutional settings. The actions 
by Congress may have ignored larger political and social 
issues, while seeming to solve simpler economic ones:
"Assuming that human beings were rational, as many 
economic theorists do, is not the same as confronting the 
observed irrationality or nonrationality that pervades 
individual and collective choices. Emphasizing a particular 
institutional or analytical milieu, the political scientist's 
tendency, without giving weight to or allowing for the 
possibility of alternative ones, can often result in a far 
less than comprehensive appreciation of a decision's many 
rich manifestations. Furthermore, a failing common to all 
general approaches is lack of concern for the unique 
qualities of each and every problem requiring analysis and 
decision: problems should suggest theoretical approaches; 
theoretical approaches do not define problems.'' (38)
However, the battle over studying Yucca Mountain is not 
over, if recent reports are any indication. First, Congress 
is facing a DoE estimate of $6 billion to characterize the 
Yucca Mountain site. Johnston had claimed the entire site 
characterization program would cost only $1 billion to $2 
billion in 1987, with benefits to Nevada thrown into the pot. 
(39) As the DoE continues to bite into the mountain with a 
tunnel boring machine similar to the one that dug the English 
Channel Tunnel, its deadline for accepting nuclear waste 
keeps slipping. At the earliest, the DoE says Yucca Mountain
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would be ready by 2010. These dynamics have set the stage for 
another consideration by Congress. Energy Secretary Hazel 
O'Leary announced on Friday, Dec. 3, 1993 that the earliest a 
repository could open would be 2013. (40)
The delays in the project itself in addressing the 
nuclear waste issue could lead to an impasse, despite the 
previous and current legislation. The ongoing internal and 
external reviews of the DoE itself spell trouble for the 
federal high-level nuclear waste program. The focus on 
economics and politics that Congress's approach so far has 
assumed may fail. The political approach has ignored 
technical, social and cultural aspects. An earlier lesson at 
Three Mile Island contained a warning about errors inherent 
in the time-based problem:
"With respect to highly complex technological 
systems, for instance those responsible for nuclear waste 
disposal, errors in design and performance may not become 
evident until many years after the system has been 
operational. Learning —  a fundamental tenet of 
incrementalism —  cannot occur until well beyond the point at 
which effective or efficient intervention can be undertaken. 
This situation presents the realistic challenge of having to 
design error-free institutions —  a challenge incrementalism 
cannot meet.'' (41)
The point being made is that complex technological 
systems may produce an entire spectrum of new problems, 
unforeseen for the designers and builders, and in the case of 
nuclear waste, potentially deadly for future generations. 
Designing error-free institutions is practically impossible
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over great spans of time.
In an earlier arena, the Congress has been faulted for 
creating legislation that defines a need, without resources 
to solve it. As Elliot Richardson said, while Secretary of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: "There is 
a fallacy abroad in the land —  and rampant in the Congress - 
- to the effect that passing legislation solves problems. .
while " n e w  legislation [often] merely publicizes a need 
without creating either the means or the resources for 
meeting it.'' (42) The approach to solving the high-level 
nuclear waste disposal problem may shift from burying it in 
the ground to long-term storage, if scientific, technical, 
social, economic and political problems continue at Yucca 
Mountain. There has already been another alternative 
proposed.
Writer Luther Carter has suggested the Nevada Test Site, 
neighbor to Yucca Mountain, become a retrievable storage area 
for the nation's high-level nuclear wastes, from spent 
radioactive reactor fuel to plutonium from dismantled nuclear 
warheads. (43) However, this solution would create another 
political dilemma. For Congress would have to revisit the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987. As Carter notes 
in a recent article, "The NWPA produced not consensus but 
conflict.'' (44) The proposal Carter makes also ignores the 
uncertainty posed by the future of the Nevada Test Site. 
President Clinton has already instructed the DoE to prepare
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the nuclear proving ground for further testing, after China 
exploded a nuclear weapon in September, 1993. (45) The Nevada 
Test Site is the only United States location approved for 
conducting underground nuclear tests. Carter urges Congress 
to place high-level nuclear waste storage on the surface at 
the Nevada Test Site, as well as continue with characterizing 
Yucca Mountain to see if it is suitable.
While Carter's suggestion is interesting. Energy 
Secretary Hazel O'Leary has undertaken an internal review and 
a fiscal study of the high-level nuclear waste program, which 
is not expected to yield results until the end of 1995. 
Whether Congress would be willing to reopen the nuclear waste 
repository issue again, so soon after the 1987 battle over 
amending the original act, remains unclear. The Department of 
Energy has come under increasing criticism for its technical 
management of the program. (46) The Clinton administration 
has had two years at the helm of this federal agency to 
review its direction and scope.
The State of Nevada remains opposed to hosting a high- 
level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. The current 
elected officials indicate no change from this adamant 
opposition. One position for the state to take would be 
continued opposition to the repository. Another course of 
action would be to bargain for social, economic and 
mitigation benefits for the entire state. While the 1987 
Amendments limit compensation to Nevada, they could be
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reopened by Congress for bargaining purposes. This option 
would require Nevada to relinquish its veto of the federal 
government's intent to build a repository at Yucca Mountain 
[according to two attorneys general opinions], but if the 
Amendments were once again addressed by Congress, the veto 
could be part of the bargaining package, as well as billions 
of dollars in federal aid and federal projects for the state. 
For such an experimental project, why should the state accept 
limited funds while bargaining away the future for 300 
generations?
How could today's Nevada agree to bargain away the moral 
rights of future generations of Nevadans or of potential 
visitors to the state? How does money resolve the issue of 
free consent? Would the DoE or the federal government be 
willing to guarantee the state where the repository is sited 
unlimited liability protection for any accidents, illnesses, 
or deaths caused? The answers to these questions are that the 
state is not free to bargain and money does not resolve free 
consent. The position of current State of Nevada officials on 
this matter appears to be that any benefits offered so far 
constitute a "bribe,'' not a payment for the nation's 
nuclear troubles. The basis to resolve these dilemmas will be 
explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
V. Conclusion;
Based on the enormous technical, financial, and social
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problems Congress is facing on the national agenda, the 
future of high-level nuclear waste disposal is uncertain. The 
November, 1994 election thrust the nuclear waste/energy 
problem onto the Clinton administration's agenda. One of the 
ongoing problems the project has to contend with is a DoE 
financial review of the Yucca Mountain Project, which may 
produce problems for the program. The national outcome could 
change the course of the project 1) without any further 
involvement of Nevada, if the Nevada Test Site, a federal 
preserve, was chosen as an interim solution; 2) with Nevada's 
continued opposition to the high-level nuclear repository at 
Yucca Mountain; 3) Nevada could sit down at the bargaining 
table for some high-stakes negotiating on the repository and 
future state benefits, if the political climate changed 
drastically; or, 4) the science may become competent, in 
which case we might learn the truth as to suitability of the 
lone site at Yucca Mountain. As stated earlier, there is no 
appetite in Nevada for offering to bargain. The stakes for 
the current economy of the state and its future are too high 
to risk. The danger for Nevada and for the progrenn as a whole 
is the potential to "engineer'' consent by policymakers, not 
independent scientists and not those affected by the project. 
But, more important, no matter what direction the nuclear 
waste program takes, the moral and ethical questions of 
protecting future generations and the matter of free consent 
remain.
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CHAPTER III
THE MYTHOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY; NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGERS 
AS THE MODERN PYRAMID BUILDERS?
I. Introduction;
America stands as a symbol and as a goal to the rest of 
the world as the embodiment of a free, open, democratic 
society, as well as an economic force which emerged as the 
leader of the free world from the horrors of two world wars. 
The United States shines like a beacon for other countries 
whose people struggle to enjoy the freedom which Americans 
take for granted in their personal, professional, and public 
lives. America has emerged as a nation from pragmatic roots 
amid the flexibility of a government which allows for its 
people to create large and small enterprises, becoming one of 
the wealthiest countries on the face of the earth. Perhaps 
one of the greatest enterprises undertaken by the United 
States was the effort to build the nuclear bomb, beginning as 
the Manhattan Project in New York, San Francisco and Chicago, 
then eventually encompassing a network of 110 facilities 
nationwide from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to the Nevada Test 
Site, 65 miles from Las Vegas, Nevada. Under the threat of
64
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Germany, Japan, or the former U.S.S.R., the United States 
mounted an unprecedented effort in monetary resources and 
manpower to develop nuclear weapons to end the war and keep 
the peace. However, the nation failed to account for the end 
product of this atomic technology, the nuclear wastes which 
will remain radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years.
This chapter will attempt to examine the consequences of 
the nation's shift from defending democracy with the best 
technical inventions possible to becoming a victim of the 
mythology of its own technology by failing to consider the 
consequences. The myth of technology is defined here as a 
society which adheres to its reliance on technological 
inventions without question, whether these constructs serve 
the prevailing culture well or not. Part of the myth 
includes such dependence on technological solutions that 
public discussion is not needed prior to decision-making, nor 
does this dependence weigh individual or collective 
responsibility in the decision process. The technological 
myth places the blame on mechanical breakdowns or mega­
bureaucracies, rather than questioning the root causes for 
its failures. This dependence and reliance on technological 
solutions leads to a degradation of the participation of the 
people who are affected by such expert decisions. A nation or 
a society no longer has to include public discussion in 
decision-making under these conditions, nor is individual or 
collective responsibility held accountable in the process.
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Rather, technology drives the process, possibly engineering 
consent from a populace overwhelmed by technique and the 
unique language of technology.
The myth of technology in today's industrial society 
places the blame on mechanical breakdowns for its cultural 
and social failures. Thus, human beings are removed from the 
responsibility of what they have produced, and how it is 
used. Decisions are considered too complicated for ordinary 
people to ponder, so are left to the experts, the "true 
believers.'' America has become the "ghost in the machine,'' 
trapped as a country and a culture in its own myth of 
technical success.
Certainly, I am not the first to critically examine this 
phenomenon of the twentieth century. Philosopher and 
historian Lewis Mumford, philosopher William Barrett, poet 
and essayist Wendell Berry, and poet William Stafford have, 
each in their own genres, portrayed the trap set by
technological wonders appearing each month on store shelves 
to accomplish tasks better, faster, and with less drudgery to 
humans, but divorcing humans from the decisions on how they 
will be engaged in the process. In this chapter, I will 
consider what each of these thinkers is trying to tell
mankind about this modern predicament, and how it relates to 
one of the most unplanned projects of our time, the
management of high-level nuclear waste in the United States.
In his series. Technology and Culture, Mumford
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foreshadowed the plateau modern industrial society has 
reached when he recognized the authoritarian approach the 
scientific experts wield in such a culture. Its basis is an 
irrational, obsessive myth, according to Mumford, used by the 
Atomic Age scientists as well as the ancient pyramid builders 
who shaped their own society through the power of geometry 
and the gargantuan project of putting stone upon stone for 
decades. Mumford characterized these new scientific experts 
and managers, especially the nuclear weapons designers, as 
" t h e  pyramid builders of our own age, psychologically 
inflated by a similar myth of unqualified power, boasting 
through their science of their increasing omnipotence, if not 
omniscience, moved by obsessions and compulsions no less 
irrational than those of earlier absolute systems: 
particularly the notion that the system itself must be 
expanded, at whatever eventual cost to life.'' (1)
Mumford's statement that the modern pyramid builders 
feed this reliance on technological omnipotence to expand 
their own myth is illustrated in plans for the federal 
government's nuclear waste management program. By allowing 
the nuclear industry to persuade Congress to amend the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, without public discussion, 
without consultation with the State of Nevada, and without 
debate on the Congressional floor, the pyramid builders have 
once again seized upon their obsessive, compulsive science to 
begin building a new paradigm of power. When Yucca Mountain,
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Nevada, was selected as the only site for the study of 
constructing a nuclear waste repository which must prevent 
the most radioactive materials ever known from entering the 
environment or coming into contact with human beings for at 
least 10,000 years, the reaction of the residents of Nevada 
was predictable, and should come as no surprise. Elected 
Nevada officials immediately protested the decision attached 
to the 1987 Omnibus Bill by Senator J. Bennett Johnston, D- 
Louisiana, who was chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Natural Resources and Energy at the time (See Chapter Two). 
There is no trace in the congressional record of the 
political maneuvering Johnston employed to pass the 
Amendments. Nevada is a politically weak state, yet its 
people, like those in most other economically healthy 
regions, are unwilling to bear such an unfair and dangerous 
burden for more than 10,000 years. Perhaps Johnston falls 
prey to the modern American belief that since technology can 
solve any problem, the politicians may choose the weakest 
state in which to site a nuclear repository, then leave it to 
the engineers to design and build it.
The issue of nuclear waste had been ignored in the heat 
of battle to defend the free world during World War II, the 
Korean War, and continuing into the Cold War era. By the time 
President Dwight Eisenhower and the leading atomic scientists 
of the day began exploring peaceful uses of atomic power, 
America was at its peak as a producer of nuclear (and most
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
other) technology. It seemed the United States could do 
anything, from producing automobiles and appliances to 
reprocessing the radioactive remains of the uranium-fueled 
nuclear reactors. In the 1950s, some scientists were 
beginning to think about the nuclear waste problem. A panel 
of the National Academy of Sciences recommended deep 
geological disposal, preferably in salt, as one alternative, 
along with shooting radioactive packages into the sun or 
burying them deep in the subseabed. (2) If the scientists 
agreed, then why Yucca Mountain?
Nevada does not benefit from nuclear power. Its climate 
is too dry and harsh to harbor nuclear reactors, which 
require enormous amounts of surface water to control the 
fission reaction generating electricity. Citizens wonder why 
they should be forced to bear the burden of burying the 
nation's (and perhaps foreign countries') spent nuclear fuel 
rods for eternity? Recorded human history began in the 
shadows about six thousand years ago. How is a living society 
expected to know what will happen in the next 10,000 years? 
Can a majority of the population, at its most tyrannical [as 
the Founding Fathers feared], force an unwilling, politically 
weak state to accept a lethal risk?
Although the ancient Greeks grappled with the same 
questions concerning government, basing their direction on 
logic and reason, the rise of the modern megamachine in which 
the civilized world is trapped today began more than 300
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years before the twentieth century, Mumford noted. He sounded 
the alarm in our present age. His example of this missed 
opportunity for reflection, for turning the world away from 
unleashing the awesome power of the atom resides in historian 
Henry Adams. In 1904 Adams had foreseen with uncanny insight 
the social consequences of increasing physical power without 
a commensurate increase of intellectual insight, moral 
discipline, social awareness, and responsible political 
direction.
Mumford draws the connection between that insightful 
need all too belatedly recognized only by a handful of 
nuclear scientists, such as Albert Einstein and J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, at the moment that bombs of cosmic violence'' 
(Adams' term) were finally invented. As Adams saw the 
prospective transformation of civilization, his insight 
illuminated the social dangers from the release from moral 
inhibitions and life-conserving taboos and practices that had 
proved essential to human survival from its earliest stages 
onward, according to Mumford. He feared that moral 
inhibitions divorced from the necessities of survival spelled 
doom for the direction of society.
By divorcing the human elements of questioning from 
social debate, by misplacing values and putting one's faith 
in technology, and by failing to foresee an emptiness at the 
end of the blind technological alley, humankind cannot see 
the upshot of this mechanical evolution and is confusing a
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reliance on the products, such as computers and their models, 
electronic monitors, or nuclear expertise, without measuring 
the impacts and outcomes on people, either in the present 
time or in future generations. By the control of the 
explosive increase in energy through nuclear technology, 
Mumford said that paranoia becomes respectable, by giving 
scientific and technological backing to infantile ambitions 
and psychotic hallucinations. An example of this can be drawn 
from physicists Edward Teller and Leo Szilard, whose global 
vision of a world threatened by political tyrants led to 
unleashing the atomic force and more than four decades of the 
tension-filled Cold War. In recent times. Teller's idea of 
the Strategic Defense initiative, popularly known as "Star 
Wars,'' further fueled the omnipotence of the authority of 
expertise and technology. On the other hand, at the moment in 
history when the atomic bomb was created, there was the 
terrible threat of Hitler and his domination of the world, of 
a more forceful Soviet Union, a fierce Japan, and other 
dictators, rattling arsenals worldwide with or without the 
help of nuclear weapons.
As the Age of Atomic Science dawned, however, Mumford 
drew the parallel between the Pyramid Age achievements and 
those of the Nuclear Age:
" .  . .A Divine King [wartime President Franklin D.
Roosevelt] embodying all the powers and prerogatives of the 
whole community, supported by a revered priesthood [secret
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enclave of scientists] and a universal religion, that of 
positive science, had begun the assemblage of the megamachine 
in a technologically more adequate and impressive forum.'' 
( 3 ) This could have been avoided if more concern had been 
expressed over the technological marvels emerging for the 
previous three hundred years, Mumford said.
In the case of nuclear technology and its attendant 
problems, the span of time between the dawn of the Atomic Age 
and an emerging dependence on nuclear energy for power 
generation is equivalent to the blink of an eye, but the 
mounting problems from radioactive wastes will remain for a 
very long time, outlasting the technical experts who invented 
them. Political direction has also been shaped by this arrow 
of time, for national leaders fear if hostile nations or 
terrorist groups can gain access to nuclear fuels stored in 
pools of water scattered around the United States near the 
nuclear reactors, the greatest country on earth could be held 
hostage. At this point in history, the modern world has 
reached a plateau, beset by dilemmas of what to do with the 
wastes remaining from the nuclear legacy. Many believe there 
is a technological solution. Others are searching for the 
most ancient solution, burying the mess and the mistakes.
This technological dilemma created by the rise of the 
nuclear industry, especially the fear of not knowing where 
the wastes may be or where they may be going, embodies the 
technological approach mankind has embraced, the path that
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Shattered the ancient Greeks' reliance on logic and reason. 
The social taboos and moral constrictions have been blown up 
and appear to be on the verge of an ignonimous burial, while 
mankind wanders aimlessly amid the marvels of technology, the 
ghost in the machine. Yet the very mechanical wonders produce 
unexpected dangers, unintended consequences which threaten 
life on earth, and ultimately, humankind's own existence. 
While ordinary humans feel isolated in this technical 
construct, today's scientists working on the problem of 
nuclear waste believe technology can solve the problem. This 
very reliance on a technological solution raises the spectre 
of immense harm to the people and the environment if anything 
goes wrong, both in the present and in the future. People 
alive today cannot choose a method for storing radioactive 
wastes for future generations. Such a decision is unethical 
because the very nature of technology changes, and modern 
nuclear wastes may become the future's resources. In 
addition, technology itself will change. The more complicated 
the solution, the greater the risks for people to fear, now 
and in the future.
What about the environmental consequences of burying 
high-level nuclear waste? With 10,000 years as a guideline, 
there is no way to predict what the outcome of leaving 
extremely heated and radioactive materials in a mountain born 
from a volcano will be. The earth may heave, may belch fire 
and ashes, or water may rise or fall within the repository,
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or the climate could change dramatically in those thousands 
of years. Mumford postulated on this blindness as the present 
attempting to peer into time. Unintended consequences are 
ignored or left unexplored because of our attention to the 
dazzling details of modern life, to the narrowest view of our 
daily lives, the engineer's viewpoint which often leads to 
the new technological wonders.
Perhaps those with enough vision left to see beyond the 
flash and the dazzle of the technological construct created 
from the Nuclear Age should heed Adams' advice. In a letter 
to history teachers written in 1910, Adams urged his 
colleagues to understand the forces at work, pool their 
collective intelligence to devise institutional changes 
necessary to turn such immense forces to human advantage, and 
thus under human control, and turn away from the uncontrolled 
bombs of cosmic violence.'' (4)
Adams grasped his extraordinary insight toward caution 
as the radical changes of the Atomic Age approached by 
reading backward into the past from the contemporary 
applications of electricity, and forward into the future from 
the probable consequences of radium, bridging time's arrow 
from a historian's perspective. But he failed to deliver 
solutions out of the quagmire, or even to be heard by the 
leading intellectuals of the day, because the Pentagon of 
Power, as defined by Mumford, was emerging. Mumford defined 
the Pentagon of Power as Political absolutism. Power
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(energy). Productivity, pecuniary Profit, and Publicity.
All of those elements exist in the latest paradigm of 
power embodied in the nuclear waste management project 
embarked on by the United States government. The site. Yucca 
Mountain, was chosen in an atmosphere of Political 
absolutism; the Power and energy driving its selection grew 
out of an elitist level of society; Productivity in the 
project, now employing more than two thousand scientists and 
engineers, is the work of nuclear specialists; if a 
repository is built at Yucca Mountain, nuclear industry 
leaders believe the public will gain new confidence in 
nuclear-generated power and allow new plants to be built for 
a Profit where none have existed in twenty years; and the 
nuclear industry is selling the idea of Yucca Mountain 
through a Publicity campaign filled with Nevada's desert as a 
wasteland, as the former continental proving ground for 
nuclear weapons, as a home of patriots, as the perfect 
solution to the annoying problem of nuclear waste that will 
not go away.
More than forty years ago, Mumford drew the parallel 
between the ancient pyramid builders and the technological 
advance of modern society. He based the emergence of the two 
paradigms on a pentagon of power. Apparently, those ancient 
builders are as industrious as ever, creating another pyramid 
based on the myth of technology, which as history 
demonstrates has failed in the past, and may fail again
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unless the latest architects are questioned on the basis of 
human values, moral and ethical constrictions, and social 
taboos. The solution to the deeper problems remaining from 
the Atomic Age is not building another pyramid, but involving 
those affected by the consequences beyond the builders, 
thereby disintegrating the pentagon of power.
Before examining the changes which are necessary to the 
current U.S. nuclear waste management program to avoid 
continuing the myth of the machine, this chapter will attempt 
to offer a brief glance at the viewpoints of two engineers, 
one who sees this problem, doubts the omnipotence of the 
mythic technology, sees the human factor, and offers his own 
solution for safely storing highly radioactive spent fuel 
rods. Here is an experienced technologist who is not a victim 
of the Myth of [Omnipotent] Technology. On the other hand, 
another engineer sees it the other way, believing in the 
myth, and sees those who worry about it as unable to realize 
all the benefits. He downplays potential harm or unintended 
consequences and has a sort of faith in the future. He is a 
victim of the myth.
II. History; Scientific and Philosophical
The issue of nuclear waste was ignored in the heat of 
the battle to defend the free world during World War II, the 
Korean War and continuing into the Cold War era. By the time
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President Dwight Eisenhower and the leading atomic scientists 
of the day began to explore peaceful uses of atomic power, 
America was at its peak as a producer of nuclear (and most 
other) technology. It seemed the United States could do 
anything, from producing automobiles and appliances, to 
reprocessing the radioactive remains of the uranium-fueled 
nuclear reactors. In the 1950s, some scientists were 
beginning to think about the nuclear waste problem. Such 
alternatives as salt, along with shooting radioactive 
packages into the sun or burying them deep in the subseabed. 
(5)
Some engineers are concerned about a technological myth 
driving not only Yucca Mountain siting policy, but even more 
mundane aspects of daily life in a democratic society, 
driving public participation further apart from the 
democratic process. By turning over the responsibility of 
operations to machines, human beings face a helpless future 
and cannot find a role to play in the day-to-day progress of 
society. In interviews conducted at the University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, during the spring of 1994, engineering professors 
expressed a conservative approach to wielding the enormous 
technical powers available to modern civilization. For 
example, Robert Skaggs, professor of mechanical engineering, 
has done work for the U.S. Department of Defense in the past 
and is conducting research into nuclear waste containers for 
the U.S. Department of Energy. As a graduate student at lowa
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State University, Skaggs worked along with metallurgists who 
extracted Uranium 238, some of whom questioned why they built 
the bomb. Skaggs said he went through some reflection on that 
question in his late 20s. He explained:
" W e  had 50 years of something we called peace with the 
bomb. But I felt, and most of the people I worked for felt. 
Western civilization and the United States, in particular, 
were in real trouble. I thought Western Civilization and 
Democracy were worth killing for. That's why I went to work 
every day. Now we sit on a giant colossus, a big, empty 
nothing, filled with pornography and sports. We are clever 
devils, but we may be too clever for our own good.'' (6)
As Mumford sounded the alarm in The Myth of the Machine, 
by divorcing the human element of questioning, by misplacing 
values, and by failing to foresee an emptiness at the end of 
the blind technological alley, humankind cannot see the 
upshot of this mechanical evolution and is confusing a 
reliance on the thing, such as computers, electronic 
monitors, or nuclear expertise, without measuring the impacts 
on, or consider the quality of action by people. Skagg's, as 
well as Mumford's, alarm is rooted in the lack of moral and 
social values applied by experts to very human problems. 
Certainly, some scientists and engineers are also concerned 
about this point.
Skaggs particularly worries about the lack of social 
values and society's increasing dependence on technology. 
'"That's what scares me, our dependence on technology and the 
shrinking portion of the population that can handle it,'' he 
said. While working his way through school, Skaggs set pins
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in a bowling alley, caddied, and ushered in a movie theatre. 
But today, " t h e  society has no room for ditch diggers 
anymore,'' he said. Machinery sets bowling pins 
automatically, golfers carry their own bags in electric carts 
and advertisements greet moviegoers, instead of human ushers. 
Humans have been replaced in mundane tasks. Could this harm 
the value placed on the struggle to complete a task? Skaggs 
believes such a reliance on the machines degrades the values 
of the work which is passed on to electronic marvels.
Skaggs believes that the declining values of the jobs 
once available for unskilled workers within the society 
erodes the middle class and the middle ground that was once 
America's democratic core. The technological emphasis in the 
nation has invented a two-class society divided between those 
who possess the skills necessary to participate in this 
brave, new world, and those who cannot function in an arena 
relying more and more on machines and procedures which demand 
greater techological skill, such as automated factories and 
nuclear power plants.
There is another problem modern mankind fails to face, 
and that is the question of time. The span of time between 
the dawn of the atomic age and an emerging dependence on 
nuclear energy for power generation is equivalent to the 
blink of an eye, but the mounting problems from radioactive 
wastes will remain for a long time, outlasting the technical 
experts who invented them. For a short span of time, spent
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nuclear fuel rods can sit in swimming pools'' or dry casks 
all over the country. In the long term, the nuclear wastes 
from reactors and defense activities have to be gathered in 
one place for safekeeping, Skaggs said. Otherwise, "We'll 
lose that stuff,'' Skaggs said. " W e  won't know where it came 
from. '' As a scientist, Skaggs follows the process of trying 
to find the best solution to a problem that had been defined 
within a geographical "equity'' in the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act. The original Act called for a study of nine sites, 
searching for one repository in the western states and one in 
the eastern states. After the 1987 Amendments passed, only 
one site remained for study, that is at Yucca Mountain.
Skaggs' and the nuclear industry's dilemma, especially 
the fear of not knowing where the wastes are, embody the 
technological approach mankind has embraced, the path beyond 
the ancient Greeks' self-questioning and reason. Like a 
ghost, modern mankind wanders aimlessly amid the marvels of 
technology, with that self-knowledge, yet our very mechanical 
wonders produce unexpected dangers, unintended consequences 
which threaten life on earth. Is it any wonder that humanity 
feels isolated? This alienation is addressed by William 
Barrett in The Illusion of Technique. (7)
In order to halt the ceaseless pyramid building, Barrett 
offers some insight into the illusion of technique that has 
been created in modern society. Barrett addresses the problem 
of language, a barrier constructed in an engineered age with
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ways of communicating beyond the capacity of the average 
citizen to understand. In a sense, he offers us a humanistic 
approach through philosophy and a return to the poets in our 
society, who can translate the technological into words and 
images understandable to those in a democratic society 
willing to take the responsibility and make the effort to 
conduct knowledgeable discussions leading to a consensus- 
based decision on such a complicated problem as nuclear waste 
management.
Today's scientists working on the problem of nuclear 
waste believe technology can solve the problem. Yet this very 
reliance on a technological solution raises the spectre of 
immense harm to the people and the environment if things go 
wrong. The more complicated the solution, the greater the 
risk, Skaggs said. Placing the nation's nuclear wastes in 
multiple-purpose casks, the solution the Department of Energy 
has chosen most recently, is not the answer, Skaggs said. 
Putting twenty-one spent fuel rods in one canister raises 
several problems, according to Skaggs:
* Eliminating heat from the spent, still radioactive, 
fuel. Heat building up inside the repository could turn water 
captured in rocks to steam, creating a possible explosion, or 
contribute to melting waste containers, providing an avenue 
for radioactivity to enter ground water.
* Criticality, or the problem of the fuel melting from 
intense heat and causing a nuclear chain reaction.
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* Handling problems for human workers. The workers could 
be exposed to higher radiation levels than current standards 
allow.
Skaggs is faced with trying to persuade the 
establishment at the Energy Department to retreat to "square 
one'' and place the nuclear fuel rods, one by one, in single 
canisters. First, Skaggs suggests, let the fuel rods sit for 
50 years, then fill each canister with cement and magnesium, 
the rods, more cement and magnesium, let it harden, and then 
weld the top. The idea is 2,000 years old, invented by the 
Romans when they ground volcanic ash and seashells, he said. 
Once the spent fuel is secured, and cooler after 50 or 100 
years, then drop it into deep geological burial. Skaggs said 
one of his students was worried about trying to persuade the 
DoE to switch to single canisters for the fuel rods and 
feared that the university team might lose its argument and 
the contract. Skaggs said he told him, "Losing is not the 
problem, being wrong is the problem. The important thing is 
doing the best you can. ' ' In the case of nuclear waste 
management, doing the best that can be done is a necessity, 
since the threat of radiation to human health and the 
environment extends across thousands of years and several 
generations.
From another engineer's viewpoint, however, technology 
allows people to do the best they can in any age, said David 
Jones, associate professor of engineering at the University
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of Nevada, Las Vegas. Humanity makes and uses tools with 
whatever is available at the time. The North American 
Indians, for example, had few skills for working in metals. 
On the other hand, many tribes were very, very sophisticated 
with plant and animal tissues. " I  could not make a basket, 
or a sinew bow string,'' Jones said. "Those people lived 
very well, they knew how to live well in their environment.'' 
( 8 ) While Native American tribes may disagree with him 
(because their culture has nearly been destroyed), Jones 
believes life is better on today's reservation with a pickup 
truck, color television set, and a refrigerator in which to 
store food. Still, people react against technological 
progress, he said. Perhaps technology is not the answer, if 
recent public debate is any indication. A tribe or neighbors 
in a poor area threatened by a refinery band together to 
force industries to clean up stack emissions or reduce 
airport noise. Political activity such as this is democracy 
in action. However, many people do not consider the economic 
consequences of forcing such environmental issues as noise 
and air pollution, Jones said. Jones's view is another 
indicator of the technological myth, relying on a single 
factor, such as economics, for justification. "McCarran 
International Airport is a source of employment and an 
economic benefit to Southern Nevada,'' he said. "Th a t  
airport is our economic engine. A lot of the time people
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don't think of economic consequences, but only what impacts 
them.''
But what about environmental consequences and whom do 
they "impact''? Jones exemplifies the narrowness, the 
blindness that Mumford and Barrett so helpfully explore in 
their works. Unintended consequences are ignored or left 
unexplored because of our attention to details, to the 
narrowest view of our daily lives, to the new technological 
toys. This scientific grasping, as it is driven by 
technological progress, has distracted the public to believe, 
against its own reason, that mechanical marvels will keep the 
world safer. At what price and for how long will technology 
last in the moral and ethical sense? Beyond the will and its 
freedom —  so extended by modern technology —  questions of 
limits to freedom arise. Through consequences of 
technological acts, we may become no longer free to do the 
kind of thinking that would redeem us from the world we 
ourselves have created. If, by dependence on the 
technological myth, we make it impossible to contemplate real 
problems, then we destroy our own culture in the process. Our 
culture was based on democratic principles, yet we may have 
rendered ourselves incapable of the serious reflection 
necessary for sustaining a thoughtful, caring society. The 
danger signs are all there, Barrett notes. When technology 
gets too noisy, pollutes our air, or is about to drive
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another superhighway through our living room, we rant against 
it. Yet we consume its products without question and come to 
see them as irreplaceable. Negotiating the high wires where 
technology triumphs, we fail to ask what preconditions of 
this technical world exist and how they bind us to its 
framework. We have forgotten to ask what to do when we fail.
And then reason, like a ghost, appears with the unasked 
and unanswered questions of Why? What is it for? What is the 
meaning of it all? The answers to these questions are not 
forthcoming from the engineers. These questions come from the 
realm of citizenship, a sense of limits, fallibility, 
critical thinking, and deliberation. And so, the appropriate 
answers await in the same realms. The technological viewpoint 
coming from arrogance, tyranny and limitlessness is 
unexamined by our society; we face an abyss seemingly created 
by the twentieth century's myth of technology and its false 
promises. Technology has dazzled us coming from a world lit 
by our own imaginations, to one where very few people 
understand the basic underpinnings of the process which 
brought us to this plateau. While the public longs for a 
safer, cleaner, quieter environment, usually through 
technology, the risks created by man in the past century or 
two cannot be eliminated.
There are no avenues to reaching zero-risk tolerance, 
the standard which is the basis of so much of what the 
public believes today, Skaggs, Jones and other technical
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experts maintain. Yet this very reliance by the public who 
call on experts to control such dangers as toxics and nuclear 
wastes removes the ability of such ordinary people to 
participate in setting acceptable risks. A society allowing 
experts, engineers, and scientists to have the control over 
risk assessment, or more importantly, risk assignment, has 
given up its reason.
Essentially, the Yucca Mountain Project is the ultimate 
example of man's attempt at mastery over the world of 
objects, an engineering feat to control the powerful forces 
mankind unleashed in this century and that appear out of 
control. The safety of the future depends on how reliable 
Yucca Mountain's engineered containment will be. The public 
has been largely ignored in the search and study for a 
solution. However, it appears Barrett is attempting to bridge 
this narrow world view of the engineers to a more humanistic 
one by turning to language, the world of words. In an effort 
to progress from this dark, ironic position in which 
technology has put the modern world, he turns to the sphere 
of the poet, an antithetical figure to the engineer. This 
philosopher's thinking revolves around the confrontation of 
these two worlds. Poetry in this sense is not an artifice of 
culture, Barrett points out, not an elegant, esoteric 
concoction of words, removing art to the periphery of common 
life. Barrett struggles to recall poetry to its primal 
dwelling among us on this earth and under the sky, touching
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the daily round of existence. If it does not, warns Barrett, 
"then we ourselves have become homeless on this earth.'' He 
contrasts the two worlds of the poet and the engineer:
"The poet walks through the woods lost in its rapturous 
presence. The engineer adds up the bulldozers needed to clear 
the trees. At some point in our lives, follow the poet's 
'wise passiveness,' learn to let it be, or we may never break 
free of the cloying clutch of our own willfulness.'' (9)
In this brief passage, the wisdom of the poet to let it 
alone, leave the spent nuclear reactor fuel rods where they 
are, until they are less dangerous to the humans who will 
have to package, transport, bury and watch them for millenia, 
appears to be a reasonable and sensible solution.
In this way, humanity may once again connect with nature 
and recover the roots of existence buried in the Earth, the 
natural environment. As the twenty-first century approaches, 
two poets stand out for their attention to the environment 
and the individual's voice crying from the wilderness wrought 
by technology. They, too, attempt to widen the narrow 
technological vision. Wendell Berry, who wrote poems from the 
heart of his daily chores as a farmer, has become an essayist 
who put technocratic language and its originators under a 
moral microscope. In Standing By Words, Berry probes the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) experts (who will pass 
judgment on Yucca Mountain, as to whether it is found 
scientifically suitable for a nuclear waste repository), who
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routinely eliminate themselves and representative human 
beings from consideration, according to the prescribed 
"objectivity'' of their discipline. "What is remarkable, 
and frightening about this [technical] language is its 
inability to admit what it is talking about,'' Berry says. 
(10)
For example, the NRC regulators and nuclear experts 
alike, refer to the Code of Federal Regulations as "CFRs,'' 
or those who protest their actions as ''NIMBY (Not-In-My- 
Backyard)'' types. By their language, these technical 
hostages of the NRC and others similar to them cannot admit 
to each other, much less the public, that nuclear problems 
involve extreme danger to many people. Their language 
disguises the dangers by euphemisms and acronyms. The "will 
to power'' has become absolute power reflected in language 
such as the NRC uses. Berry says. "The commissioners speak a 
language that is diminished by inordinate ambition: the 
taking of more power than can be responsibly or beneficently 
held." (11)
William Stafford is another poet who attempts to measure 
everything by a careful choice of words, selecting the 
boundaries within his imagination to bring a little life into 
the technical shaping of a poem. To deal with the terrible 
potential destruction unlocked in the nuclear age, Stafford 
wrote a poem about the Nevada Test Site where atomic weapons 
which exploded above the desert sands rivaled the sun for
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heat and light. He never speaks of "mushroom clouds" or 
"radioactivity." Instead, he concentrates on the image of a 
lizard:
At the Bomb Testing Site
At noon in the desert a panting lizard 
waited for history, its elbows tense, 
watching the curve of a particular road 
as if something might happen.
It was looking at something farther off 
than people could see, an important scene 
acted in stone for little selves 
at the flute end of consequences.
There was just a continent without much on it 
under a sky that never cared less.
Ready for a change, the elbows waited.
The hands gripped hard on the desert. (12)
The awful anticipation of the atom's destructive power 
is captured in the image of the lizard's "hands gripped 
hard,'' allowing the reader to detach for a moment and 
contemplate the unthinkable. Stafford avoids overwhelming the 
reader with political statements or shrill diatribe. The 
unthinkable comes home in the image of a lizard interrupted 
by something not right in its environment. Like Stafford, it 
seems that Barrett is pleading for humanity to listen to its 
poets for providing a map to the path leading out of the 
technocratic maze and toward a synthesis with nature. By 
attempting to bring humanity into the engineering equation, 
Barrett arrives at the moral will and its practice in 
freedom.
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Freedom is the insatiable subject of our quest, he says. 
Technique and technology loom today as the negative and 
opposing face to freedom, or the perfect example of free will 
with no limits. The "perfect example,'' however, contains no 
values. The philosophical task for our own day appears to be 
the search for a positive conception of freedom. Without a 
positive sense of freedom, we cannot respond to the original 
question of what led us on this philosophical quest. It the 
cosmos and ecology are important, then limits must be known 
and acknowledged. Heidegger stressed that the great 
philosophers of the past were always consumed by a single 
vision:
" T o  think is to confine oneself to a single thought 
that one day stands still like a star in the world's sky. '' 
(13)
Heidegger's Being, his one idea, shines like a brilliant 
star, but Barrett points out Heidegger's one area of 
ignorance, deliberate or not, above his insights that gave 
subjectivistic constructions to modern aesthetics. That is 
the matter of ethics itself. To reclaim the ethical ground, 
people living in a democracy must practice citizenship to 
regain a sense of limits, fallibility, and deliberation.
From its beginning when Aristotle introduced ethics, 
the will has been central as "deliberative desire,'' Barrett 
said. (14) It is the place in our psychic landscape where 
reason and appetite meet. Where our wishes and emotions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
submit to reason, reason in turn is activated by desire. 
Here, Barrett said, is the human being as practical agent. 
(15)
Barrett defines this moral will as wrongfully 
transformed by the myth into the will to self-assertion and 
dominance, the will to power. (16) Here is the point where 
technological mythology could step in to fill the gap left by 
those existing in the seeming floating, rootless world of 
technology. Here humans may abdicate their individual and 
collective responsibilities by relying on the machines. If 
the computer is down, how am I responsible for working, 
thinking, learning? If the scientists can create artificial 
intelligence, then why not hand over the messy and mundane 
tasks to robots? If nuclear energy is available as a 
seemingly limitless source of electrical power, then why not 
let the engineers design a container for the endless wastes 
from that fuel cycle? But, Barrett asks, if the matter of 
ethics is inseparably involved with the will, and if the will 
has been compromised and even polluted at its source, how can 
one go ahead and develop an ethics?
Freedom enters. "Freedom is the condition of truth 
itself, for unless we are free to let be, to let things show 
themselves as what they are [within limits], we will only 
force our willful distortions upon them." (17) Barrett 
suggests that modern philosophers have ignored the moral will 
as the center of the personality. At the same time, modern
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philosophers have left the soul out of the argument that the 
truth, disclosure, the Aletheia, brings the imminence of 
death with it, something the poets have known all along. To 
be free toward one's death I Here Barrett means the death of 
ideas, as well as the end of physical existence. He insists 
we have to listen to nature;
" T h e  history of science abounds in cases of scientists 
who cling tenaciously to their pet theory, refuse to be
dislodged from it, twist facts to fit into it, or remain
resolutely blind to whatever facts resist such twisting. The 
pet theory has become such an ingrained part of their vision 
of things that they cannot see it for what it is because they 
are always seeing everything else through it.'' (18)
The " p e t  theory'' in the modern age is the
technological mythology that drives the scientist and the 
engineer into a moral blindness. Freedom, however, lies 
within each of us as the way we let the world open before us. 
With a definition of freedom as opening the world to us, 
Barrett attempts to define the moral will as one beyond 
values and imperatives, one that carries its own light to 
guide us. He urges us to let be, as Heidegger defined it by 
the word Gelassenheit. (19) And we move within this light in 
the most ordinary traffic of daily life, as well as within 
gigantic projects such as Yucca Mountain, that tend to dwarf 
human perspective and engulf its feeble attempts to 
understand. Heidegger saw our age as the night of the world, 
where the old gods fled and a new god has not arrived. While 
some engineers hope to replace the old gods with technology, 
the moral will of the human being should be the guiding
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principle here. The United States with its democratic 
foundations is poised to take the moral path within a sense 
of its freedom.
In our position as the nation which upholds freedom more 
than any other, the people have become blind and deaf to the 
corruption of the technological myth. There are so many other 
distractions in this world, most of them based on a 
breathtaking experience provided by technology. Why turn off 
the hair dryers, air conditioners, television sets, 
computers, monitors, or the tools of this age's trade? 
Mastering the on/off switch is easy, almost built into the 
modern human from incubator to resuscitator. The moral will 
decides the position of the on/off switch. Technology can 
push the fear of death into the future, but it can also 
spread the word about freedom, helping America to find 
herself again. Barrett notes that humans will stop being free 
only when the species loses the idea of freedom.
III. Conclusion:
Technology has failed its human masters if, at the end 
of a half-century of transforming the destructive power of 
the atom into a source of energy and light, the best solution 
to the remains of this nuclear dawn is buried in the shifting 
ground, the oldest and the most primitive method to erase 
mistakes, to bring eras to an end, to close an individual
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life. However, the current proposed final solution cannot be 
discovered within technological mythology. Some engineers and 
some scientists have the knowledge and the skill to ask the 
hard questions and throw some skepticism on technology, while 
others tell us technology is our salvation. To solve modern 
problems people need more than technical expertise. There is 
a question, perhaps formed by the philosophers and the poets, 
that humanity needs to ask before it loses its ideal and 
meaningful perception of freedom: Where does technology take 
us?
That question leads to another one: does the public have 
the moral will to pursue such a path of inquiry and the 
patience to recognize the freedom within limits, which we 
would bear in the asking? If the American people fail to 
question the expertise of technicians, to dare question the 
power they have invested in technology and engineering, the 
principles of freedom, balance of power and the protection of 
human rights, fundamentals on which the nation was founded, 
are threatened. Indeed, by forcing a nuclear waste repository 
on a single state, albeit a politically weak one, the tyranny 
of the majority which the Founding Fathers feared may weaken 
the democratic foundation of the United States.
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CHAPTER IV
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INHERENT ETHICAL PROBLEMS
In his closing summary, after successfully attaching the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments onto the 1987 Omnibus 
Bill, Senator J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., said: " I  think 
it's fair to say we've solved the nuclear waste problem with 
this legislation. The problem with nuclear waste has never 
been scientific, it's always been emotional and political.''
(1) Indeed, Senator Johnston won the legislative battle to 
restart the stalled nuclear waste management program, since 
his bill removed all other alternatives and singled out Yucca 
Mountain as the lone site for study as the nation's proposed 
high-level nuclear waste repository. However, scientific and 
democratic issues of site selection remain unresolved. The 
1987 political decision stripped science of its fundamental 
role of experimentation and raised the stakes on the value of 
fairness, placing scientists in the role of proving the site 
suitable since it is the only one (politically) available. 
However, the legislation failed to link science and politics.
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meaning there is no equitable method of making this decision 
without confronting the issues of fairness, equity, the 
rights of states and sovereign nations, and intergenerational 
justice during the process. In a democratic government, the 
participation of the people is fundamental to the process 
and the 1987 NWPA Amendments effectively eliminated such 
involvement, ensuring a NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) reaction 
from Nevada residents and Indian tribes.
A brief survey of the reasons why Johnston's legislation 
failed to solve the nuclear waste dilemma may be helpful at 
this point. Many distinguished nuclear experts have correctly 
noted that public acceptance is the most consistent obstacle 
to acceptance of nuclear power within the United States, and 
the case would also apply to nuclear repository siting. A 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission task force concluded in 
1978 that failures in radioactive waste management stemmed 
from neglecting non-technological components in the system.
(2) In the same year, the Deatch Report warned that nuclear 
waste policy and programs must be credible to the American 
public. (3) An interagency review group reported to the 
president in 1979 that institutional issues could be harder 
to solve than the technical problems. (4) President Jimmy 
Carter observed in a 1980 message that government had failed 
to solve the nuclear waste problem in the past because the 
federal level failed to involve state and local governments, 
as well as the public, in policy decisions. (5)
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Federal efforts to manage increasing nuclear wastes at 
individual reactors had failed before the 1980s when those 
earlier attempts concentrated on only the one medium of 
underground salt mines for permanent disposal. The research 
and development at the time, discussed in the reports 
previously noted in this chapter, cited inadequate funding, 
few sites to study and inadequate ideas for technological and 
scientific capabilities which compounded the problem of 
managing nuclear waste. Although the U.S. Department of 
Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had primary responsibility for 
nuclear waste management before 1980, a new institution, the 
State Planning Council, might have approached the problem in 
a more equitable manner, with consideration of social and 
economic impacts. Created by President Carter, it was 
composed of eight governors, five other state and local 
officials, an Indian tribe representative, and the heads of 
the EPA, DoE, the Departments of Transportation and Interior, 
but failed to survive the Reagan era when most of the current 
nuclear waste management legislation has been approved by 
Congress. Clearly, there was a pattern of failure in nuclear 
waste management before the latest approach became law.
All along the federal government could have exercised 
its preemption of state authority, such as creating a nuclear 
waste disposal site on the Nevada Test Site, a federal 
reserve since 1951. However, in the 1980s Department of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
Defense and Department of Energy officials sought an 
expansion of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada site 
during the Reagan era of Strategic Defense Initiative, 
popularly known as "  Star Wars'' space defenses, and the 
DoE's nuclear waste managers began seeking other ground for 
waste burial. Yucca Mountain, adjacent to the Test Site on 
its western flank, is owned by the U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management and the U.S. Air Force. While federal radiological 
regulations and the Interstate Commerce Clause appear to 
preempt state efforts to regulate bringing nuclear waste 
shipments into Nevada or another involuntary site, a state or 
local government could exercise control over such an 
industrial development as a repository within the state and 
regulate intrastate transport, protect worker health and 
safety, collect state taxes, preserve scarce ground water, or 
impose zoning regulations as well. The Yucca Mountain 
solution is based on an instrumental decision with a faith in 
technological solutions which perhaps are not as well 
developed as the general public may accept. If Congress 
wishes to escalate the argument further, to an authoritarian 
stage, imposing the site on an unwilling state, it could 
preempt any state claim by storing or disposing of nuclear 
waste at the Nevada Test Site or another federally-owned 
facility. This, in turn, could trigger a lengthy, unpalatable 
legal war. Perhaps that is why, up until this point, 
preemption has been avoided by the federal government.
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Senator James McClure, D-Idaho, also attempted to place a 
pre-emptive clause in the original 1982 Act. It was rejected 
by Congress.
Whether federal scientists proclaim Yucca Mountain 
suitable to safely dispose of high-level nuclear waste for 
10,000 years and more, or another site must be chosen, there 
is currently no acceptable resolution to the disparate values 
posed by these difficult ethical questions. Public responses 
to such questions as who pays in terms of money or health and 
safety, who benefits, who bears the burden of cleanups after 
accidents, and who enjoys what rights are serious problems 
which have not been considered in the process of nuclear 
waste management. Most Nevadans (6) as well as the 
populations of other states along major transportation routes 
on which truckloads and trainloads of nuclear waste would 
travel, refuse to accept the unknown risks to human 
populations and the environment from such a long commitment 
as permanent geological disposal at a distant location 
requires. Proposed waste sites with long histories of bearing 
a nuclear burden from weapons development, i.e., Hanford, 
Wash., and Southern Nevada, questioned the additional burdens 
of hosting nuclear repository sites, after participating in 
the Cold War atomic weapons production and nuclear testing 
both above and below ground for more than 40 years. The 
residents of these areas, who consider themselves 
" downwinders'' after living near nuclear facilities for so
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many years, believe they would assume a disproportionate 
share of nuclear energy's hazards, without substantial 
benefits. Nevada does not produce any of its electricity from 
a nuclear power reactor. None of the state's power companies 
contemplate building a nuclear power plant, according to 
public plans filed with the Public Service Commission of 
Nevada.
Another example of this failure of the federal 
government from applying equity to nuclear waste management 
concerns its treatment of Native American tribes who claim 
the land in and around the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level 
nuclear waste repository. Indeed, tribes shared the Yucca 
Mountain site as sacred ground for hunting and ceremonies as 
long as 1,700 years ago, state studies indicate. Leaders of 
the Western Shoshone Nation and the Las Vegas and Moapa 
Valley Band of Paiutes have repeatedly asked the DoE for a 
participatory role in the siting and transportation of 
nuclear wastes. They have been ignored. They have never 
received federal funding from the DoE for independent 
studies, although the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act defined 
Indian tribes as affected, sovereign nations and therefore 
able to enter cooperative agreements with the federal agency 
to receive full benefits as an affected entity. The twenty- 
four tribes within Nevada are threatening lawsuits against 
the DoE unless recognition and funding are forthcoming (7). 
The federal government has yet to respond to any state,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
community or tribe's perception of socio-economic risks.
Instead, responsible governmental agencies have 
considered overall safety based on existing radiation 
exposure standards as a method in determining equity. Whether 
it be the amount or distribution of such risks, the issue of 
how those risks are assigned remains the basic problem in 
terms of public acceptance, and this premise is unclear under 
both the law and the guidelines by which the DoE operates. 
While President Carter stated in 1980 that the major 
objective in determining equity is that all costs of storage 
should ultimately be borne by the beneficiaries of nuclear 
power, the decision by President Ronald Reagan in 1985 to 
combine defense nuclear wastes and commercial radioactive 
reactor spent fuel rods in one repository further muddies an 
equitable funding process. Since 1993 the Department of 
Energy has contributed $130 million per year of its defense 
funding for nuclear weapons to the Yucca Mountain Project, 
further confusing the equitable funding issue since the 
defense funds are taxpayers' dollars. (8) By 1996, if 
Congress approves the DoE's proposed budget, nearly $500 
million in defense dollars, will have been spent on the 
management of nuclear waste (in addition to the fees 
contributed by nuclear power ratepayers). While Carter's 
underlying principle appeared to be balancing benefits and 
costs, later political decisions ignored this important
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equity issue of the ratepayer-beneficiaries paying for the 
risks.
Unfortunately, even Carter's premise for placing the 
economic burden of permanent storage of nuclear wastes on 
ratepayers applied only to intragenerational policy. The 
principle apparently included financial losses, but not 
bodily harm, such as health risks. If balancing benefits and 
costs is applied to interim storage and the final repository, 
the gap between those losing and those benefiting widens 
further. At this point several equity issues emerge.
Nuclear energy benefits only a few, namely the current 
and the immediate next generation, with substantially reduced 
benefits available to succeeding generations as reactors shut 
down and are decommissioned. There is an argument considered 
in risk assessment that says the allowable risk should 
diminish over time rather than remain constant or increase. 
Yet in the case of high-level nuclear wastes, the radiation 
risks run into the tens of thousands of years with hardly any 
reduction in risks for 20 millenia (20,000 years according to 
DoE studies of heat and radiation from spent nuclear fuel). 
In future cultures the people may not be willing to tolerate 
such hazards or such uncertain technologies over time, and 
there is no account in the current management program for the 
need to change the allowable risk level over extended time 
periods. In order to provide an equitable solution, any waste
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management scheme should be sited and operated to avoid 
foreclosing future options to allow succeeding generations to 
recapture the wastes and make them useful, while reducing the 
risks to these generations. As early as 1980, the National 
Research Council's Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
criticized the DoE's Environmental Impact Statement produced 
in 1979, saying only a "superficial discussion of equity 
issues'' provided an inadequate basis for analysis and 
apparently confused equity with public acceptance. This 
attitude by the DoE has not changed.
The DoE's inadequacies, as pointed out by the NRC's 
committee, remained uncorrected in the final Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) issued in 1980. Every major report on 
the issue of nuclear waste management has identified the 
neglect of socio-economic issues as the central element 
leading to failure of attempted programs to date. Neither 
have equity nor intergenerational issues been given serious 
analysis in any of the major reports, either by federal or 
independent agencies. The DoE's National Plan produced in 
1981 indicates that the nuclear waste management program will 
be " .  . . compatible with broad social values,'' (9) but the 
nature of these social values accompanied by a coherent plan 
for achieving them are missing. Based on independent reviews 
of how various federal agencies handled equity and social 
issues for nuclear waste policy and regulations to date, 
there are no rational and consistent principles of equity;
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past and current governmental equity is piecemeal, internally 
inconsistent, and frequently in direct conflict with other 
agencies or with Presidential policy. In addition, social, 
ethical, and economic issues in nuclear waste policy are 
poorly understood. (10)
Public disenchantment with nuclear wastes, in my 
opinion, does not originate with the parochial "Not-In-My- 
Backyard' ' (NIMBY) syndrome. Rather, the general public 
identifies the nuclear waste issue with the nuclear power 
debate in general, which intensified after the 1979 Three 
Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania, followed by the 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor catastrophe in 1986. While the 
public appears to many scientists and engineers to be overly 
critical of nuclear power, there is a genuine concern for 
safety issues and the uncertainty is understandable. Nuclear 
scientists generated atomic weapons first, before radiation 
was harnessed to produce electricity. The two are 
inextricably bound in the public mind. In addition, the 
Atomic Energy Commission and the DoE have caused and 
perpetuated a continuing public distrust with the recent 
revelations of human radiation exposure experiments on 
patients without their consent, dating back more than 5 0 
years, and seeming callous disregard for and mismanagement of 
nuclear safety at the weapons facilities, which resulted in 
radiation exposures to the public off those sites.
The risks inherent in nuclear power make evaluations by
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either experts or the public difficult. There is uncertainty 
in predicting the probability of risk because, 1) there is no 
long-range experience with disposal, 2) there are only 
computer models and simulations able to portray catastrophic 
events, and 3) risk assessments —  given the changing 
technology and the time span for nuclear waste management —  
create an impossible hurdle for gauging risks to future 
generations, even among the experts. Nuclear energy and the 
attendant wastes raise public fears because of their very 
natures: radiation is cumulative, it's invisible, and its 
harmful effects occur many years after exposure in the form 
of cancer, a particularly horrifying illness dreaded by 
people for its way of killing. It is a major source of social 
anxiety, as Paul Slovic and his associates at Decision 
Research discovered how fearfully the public reacted to nine 
characteristics of thirty technologies. When Decision 
Research conducted a 1979 study people put nuclear power at 
the extreme high end as risky for most of the 
characteristics. (11)
In addition to its roots in the mass weapons of 
destruction, nuclear power operates in a centralized system, 
needs complex technology, is managed by a few elite experts 
who do not understand public fears, and is a mystery to most 
ordinary people. This same mystique applies to nuclear 
energy's endproduct, nuclear waste. Several factors have 
converged to jeopardize the development of nuclear power.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
besides the U.S. and former Soviet Union reactor accidents. 
First, the rise of the environmental movement brought a call 
for scaled-down technologies and grass-roots participation in 
decision-making. The radioactive element plutonium —  a man- 
made pollutant with the potential for poisoning from within 
the human body from an invisible speck and a long radioactive 
half-life of 24,000 years —  galvanized those who argue for 
caring for the Earth to prevent spoiling it for future 
generations. Those nuclear scientists who created plutonium 
in the modern world appear to be contrary to and at the 
opposite extreme of an ecologically sound social spectrum. 
The political arena, however, is forever in motion. In the 
1990s there has been a conservative political shift to 
disband big government, a refusal of accepting major 
industrial leaders in scarce seats at the table of power, to 
a newer, cleaner, information age as embodied in the 
philosophy of Alvin and Heidi Toffler. (12) The new 1995 
Congress also appears to be attempting to bring the federal 
government into a more fiscally conservative operation by 
trimming what is perceived as wasted tax dollars. While the 
nuclear industry has enjoyed a benefit of spreading its risk 
over ratepayers and taxpayers alike, as noted with the shift 
in DoE's funding at the Yucca Mountain Project, not to 
mention the risk from operating and managing its facilities 
nationwide, the more cautious approach by Congress may signal 
a closer scrutiny of the business of nuclear power, its costs
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to society, and to the risks involved in the current approach 
to waste management (13).
In addition to the dismal history of nuclear energy and 
its failure in acceptance by the public in the past 50 years, 
even newer threats to the integrity of public acceptance for 
its future loom on the immediate horizon. As the Cold War 
fades into history, nuclear accidents or acts of terrorism at 
the 110 operating U.S. nuclear reactors and those 250 nuclear 
power plants around the world will inevitably occur. Combined 
with the announced slowdown of cleanup at the DoE's weapons 
sites, (14) the public may become alarmed once again at the 
lack of environmental sensitivity displayed by the DoE, a 
federal agency which has controlled the development of the 
atom since its inception as both a weapon and an energy 
source. The American people's fears will not be put to rest 
in the current approach to nuclear waste management. To date, 
the DoE has approached public participation as an educational 
process bordering on propaganda, rather than allowing the 
public to play a critical role in its operations. The latest 
pamphlet produced by the Yucca Mountain Project Office in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, is a prime example.
Titled "Nevada and the Yucca Mountain Project,'' the 
materials inside the beige folder appeal to "Nevadans' 
Heritage: All for Our Country,'' which "reflects Nevadans' 
loyalty to President Lincoln and the Union during the Civil 
War. Although Nevada was still a territory at the onset of
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the war, Nevadans contributed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to the war effort, well above what was required by 
law. Much of it was generated by the wealth of the Comstock 
Lode.'' (15) The conclusion to this bit of Nevada history in 
the brochure is that 87 percent of the state is owned by the 
federal government. In addition to Nevada's silver, Lincoln 
also needed the state's voters to win the 1864 election. 
Nevada became the 36th state one week before that crucial 
election. And, it has been a vital base to military as well 
as nuclear weapons operations since that time, much to the 
dismay of disgruntled ranchers and miners who formed the 
Sagebrush Rebellion in 1970 in an effort to snatch the land 
out of the tentacles of federal control and bring it under 
state jurisdiction. A second wave of these protesting 
citizens has formed today, as the discontent spreads beyond 
Nevada's borders. These rebellious citizens are demanding the 
federal government give up its hold on so much of the lands 
in the western states. Six Nevada state senators are leading 
the efforts today. (16) This slice of Nevada historical 
perspective is not new, but the DoE's approach to selling it 
may not be as successful as a simple appeal to patriotism. 
Nevadans and other westerners consider themselves beseiged by 
federal government activities and their inability to control 
their own destiny fuels public frustrations.
Clearly when it comes to nuclear power and its wastes, 
Nevadans are not the only U.S. citizens to feel a certain
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wariness toward federal solutions. The historical pattern of 
false starts and mismanagement by both Congress and the DoE 
in nuclear waste management heighten the sense of mistrust 
toward the Yucca Mountain solution by the federal government. 
The people have become wary because they believe neither 
nuclear industry officials nor federal leaders have told the 
truth about the risks from this complex technology, and the 
public considers its representatives have failed to protect 
them at the expense of the nuclear power enterprise. (Senator 
J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., author of the 1987 NWPA 
Amendments, received $300,000 in 1994 campaign contributions 
from the nuclear industry, according to the Congressional 
Record ). This threat to well-being perceived by the current 
generation poses a moral problem for nuclear waste policy 
over time in that the level of mistrust only increases. 
Another issue raised here concerns the longevity of social 
institutions. Since civilization with written records as we 
know it has existed for an estimated 6,000 years, how can 
today's political institutions expect to continue protecting 
the public for at least 10,000 years, the minimum radioactive 
lifespan of the spent fuel rods in the nuclear repository? 
Which institution would or could exist for so many years?
If the potential harm from nuclear wastes threaten both 
current and future generations, then the intergenerational 
inequity seems less urgent, since the risks are spread across 
long time spans. Yet this very lengthy time span makes the
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very nature of the moral dilemma unclear. Current perceptions 
of moral issues include our concern for the consequences of 
our actions, the certainty (or uncertainty) of those 
consequences, and our ability to control them. But the more 
time that passes between the decision and the consequences, 
the more uncertain these outcomes become. Reasonably, it 
can be argued that the intergenerational moral issue is a 
major stumbling block in proceeding to formulate nuclear 
energy and waste policy. By failing to agree on what risks we 
can justifiably leave for future generations, we are unable 
to confront the technical solutions for nuclear energy 
problems. This uncertainty in assigning risk has also led 
American leaders to a flurry of political activity in the 
form of legislation in less than 10 years, after the issue of 
nuclear waste had been ignored, diminished, or poorly handled 
for nearly five decades.
Although the atom offers the public a source of energy, 
medical diagnosis, and advanced industrial processes, its 
meaning within the social structure is not clear. The 
radioactive wastes remaining from nuclear activities put 
further strain on defining a social solution for dealing with 
spent fuel rods, weapons materials, diagnostic and industrial 
sources indefinitely. Obstacles to maintaining the safety of 
these materials include the disarray in today's institutions 
responsible for nuclear waste management, the resources to 
continue safe maintenance and the changing political climate
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within America's democratic form of government. Before long­
term security and monitoring is considered, the waste 
disposal project encompasses design, construction, operation 
and closure, followed by continued research into operations 
after closing the repository, a time span which may extend 
for 100 years or more. During the first century, in order to 
have a safe repository, a formal organization must oversee 
each step. The first 35 years of trying to address nuclear 
waste management has proven how difficult this will be, since 
the federal government has given three different agencies the 
responsibility and critics of the current program have called 
for yet another independent organization to oversee long­
term management. Those three federal agencies to date include 
the former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and the DoE.
Once a deep geological site opens, it would need the 
most technically knowledgeable nuclear experts, as well as 
those at the top of their professions in physical and social 
sciences, to monitor and protect the grounds. How such a 
diverse group of experts would maintain a mission of 
guardianship for more than 100 years remains unresolved. 
Alvin Weinberg in 1972 suggested a "nuclear priesthood'' to 
secure the high-level nuclear waste site. (17) Along with 
monuments, international symbols for danger and 
radioactivity, and presumably fencing, Weinberg urged nuclear 
scientists to train specialists as "high priests'' to pass
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on the knowledge about the site from one generation to the 
next. This approach to protecting future generations from 
today's dangers has been criticized by sociologist Kai 
Erikson, who has written and lectured about the fragility of 
social institutions, as well as the impermanence and 
irrelevance of such invented, engineered systems. Erikson has 
noted that pharaohs' curses did not stop treasure hunters 
from looting Egyptian tombs and temples for buried riches. 
In addition, the world's languages change roughly every 500 
years, making warning signs difficult to maintain over the 
life of a nuclear repository. (18)
To complicate this long-range perspective, the DoE has 
operated under its nuclear waste program plan according to a 
rigid schedule and inflexible "milestones'' to open a 
repository as soon as possible. These two major roadblocks 
are neither reasonable nor scientific, and the approach was 
criticized in 1990 by the National Research Council's Board 
on Radioactive Waste Management, which recommended that the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission revise its detailed licensing 
requirements to a more flexible approach for the DoE to 
follow. By adopting a qualitative approach, the DoE could 
incorporate surprises, so models, designs, and planning may 
be changed as problems arise. However, competing external 
forces such as public demands about lowering risk to the 
lowest level possible in long-term nuclear disposal and 
congressional laws, entrap the DoE from adopting the more
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experimental approach to the project, while Congress has 
mandated the disposal of the wastes in a single site, and the 
repository study schedule is driven by unrealistic deadlines.
The NRC's Board even offered an avenue for the DoE to 
try through developing a risk communications system. Instead 
of dictating or trying to alter the public perception of the 
extent of risks, the DoE and the other nuclear waste managers 
would communicate with the public about the risks, both those 
which cannot be avoided and those which may be avoided, 
listen to people's concerns, then incorporate those 
perceptions into the design, construction and maintenance of 
any nuclear waste solution. This approach is contrary to the 
large, entrenched organization in place to manage the 
radioactive waste repository over the long term, but vital in 
a democratic form of government. Resistance to further 
progress in nuclear waste management by the public is
certain, unless the DoE bureaucracy or another institution 
replacing it work to correct perceptions of risks, health, 
safety, inequity, environmental threats, and accidents, and 
correct their errors in the open. The uncertainty of this
approach is a healthy one, as experimental as the normal
practice of science. Without dealing with the public's
perceptions, no long-term, stable monitoring institution is 
possible.
Another approach nuclear managers should consider goes 
beyond public participation. Demands for greater public
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control in the nuclear energy debate began with the old 
Atomic Energy Commission and its rigidity led to its 
downfall. Public involvement and increasing control over 
nuclear issues will continue to grow as the program unfolds. 
The DoE has followed in the AEC's footsteps by ignoring 
expansion of public participation in policy analysis and 
decision-making. Rather than continuing an authoritarian and 
paternalistic approach to nuclear waste management, the 
organization charged with nuclear management should approach 
it from a shared authority and control. By expanding the 
basis for gathering information, without attempting to 
control the flow of information or color it the way DoE has 
attempted (the appeal to patriotism in the pamphlet cited), 
nuclear waste managers may expand the knowledge which will 
form the basis to an intelligent and a reasonable approach. 
Uncertainty cannot be entirely eliminated. For any management 
program, however, uncertainty cannot be ignored and should 
not be minimized to the public who perceives nuclear wastes 
and their disposal as among the highest risks.
In the final chapter, I will offer some suggestions for 
further consideration in an effort to avoid a catastrophic 
solution to what has been an ongoing problem. First, here is 
a summary of the failures of the current nuclear waste 
management program:
I. Assurances that relevant social and institutional 
obstacles have been fully identified and assessed by
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responsible governmental agencies have not been fulfilled 
because of 1) institutional fragmentation existing in 
planning, 2) these agencies do not understand the systematic 
or site-related social and economic consequences of the waste 
facilities and transportation, 3) the uncertainty and failure 
to date of consulting and concurring with states, Indian 
tribes and other governments on a voluntary basis for 
acceptance of waste, 4) inadequate equity analysis and the 
lack of an institutional basis for overcoming inequities, 5) 
failure to propose contingency plans for dealing with 
unexpected, "surprise'' events during site characterization, 
and 6) failure to set a realistic and flexible schedule for 
studying any proposed repository site.
II. There is no assurance that institutional and 
financial resources will be available or have been committed 
to overcoming present and future obstacles to this 
unpalatable project. With the addition of defense wastes in a 
proposed repository which had been planned only for 
commercial spent reactor fuel, it is uncertain how great the 
burden on the taxpayers, as well as the ratepayers, will be 
in the future. Although the Interagency Review Group and the 
DoE had furnished a generalized perspective and plan with a 
program, the detailed analysis has not been completed to 
date.
III. The public remains as uncomfortable and as deeply 
distrustful today over nuclear power and its attendant
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nuclear wastes, putting risks and concerns over nuclear 
technology near the top of the list of perceived risks, above 
other involuntary behaviors. Officials cannot brush aside 
these concerns, since they are rooted in the nature of the 
risks, the social and political history of nuclear power 
itself, and the neglect of the nuclear establishment in the 
past to the ethical questions and the environmental problems. 
The issue of transporting nuclear wastes through 43 states 
has gained special attention and has raised fears among 
residents living in these corridor states. (19)
At the beginning of this chapter, it was conceded that 
Senator Johnston won the legislative battle in 1987 with 
passage of amendments he authored, narrowing nuclear waste 
repository site selection. He may win the war to build the 
repository at Yucca Mountain, although his retirement in 1996 
from Congress will diminish his political base within the 
Capitol. However, fundamental moral, ethical, scientific and 
democratic issues have not been resolved. There is no socio­
economic link between the science and the politics of nuclear 
waste, and until a fair, impartial and voluntary solution to 
the nuclear waste dilemma occurs, the foundations of the U.S. 
political system deserve careful observation, in case cracks 
not unlike those in nuclear reactor pipelines threatening the 
safety of the entire power plant begin to emerge in the 
nation's democratic base.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION; ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
U.S. MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR WASTE
I. Introduction;
The current system proposed for managing the nation's 
most radioactive waste remaining after fifty years of the 
Cold War was initiated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, and, as amended in 1987, appears to be failing in 
economic, social, ethical, and scientific terms. In the past 
year, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) have both become the latest in a 
long list of agencies issuing reports critical of the way the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) has handled the Yucca 
Mountain Project, the site characterization study to 
determine if a volcanic mountain made of tuff can safely 
store highly radioactive wastes for more than 10,000 years. 
Since the GAO is the investigative arm of Congress and the 
NRC is the agency responsible for licensing the first high- 
level nuclear waste repository in the world and both have
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expressed critical views of the current program, it appears 
the time has come to take stock of other approaches to the 
nuclear waste problem, including public discussion about the 
current solution and possible alternatives. This final 
chapter will offer some suggestions for alternatives to the 
current nuclear waste management approach undertaken by the 
United States.
II. History:
There is a history of calls for an independent review of 
DoE's approach to its nuclear waste management program and 
the Yucca Mountain Project, in particular, dating from 1992. 
(1) The first critical report in December 1992, came from the 
GAO'S Transition Series Report, ""Resolving DoE's Nuclear 
Waste Disposal Dilemma,'' (2) followed by the March 1993 
report by the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 
report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy. (3) In May 
1993, the GAO issued another report, '"Nuclear Waste: Yucca 
Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing Major Scientific 
Uncertainties,'' which concluded that if Congress funded the 
site studies at $200 million per year, it would take 23 
years, or until the year 2014, and cost $2.1 billion in 1993 
dollars to complete site characterization. (4) Although 
Congress has funded the program at $200 million or more each 
year, the Yucca Mountain Project is still behind schedule.
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The GAO then recommended the Congress wait until 1) the 
Secretary of Energy had reviewed the program; 2) an 
independent review, similar to one recommended by the Nulcear 
Waste Technical Review Board, had been completed; and 3) 
""appropriate legislative, policy, and/or programmatic 
changes to the progreim have been implemented. ' ' (5) The GAO's 
report was followed by a June 1993 unanimous resolution from 
the Western Governors' Association, ""Independent Review of 
the High-Level Radioactive Waste Program,'' also requesting 
such a broad, independent study of the entire DoE program. 
(6) Neither the Bush administration nor Congress acted on the 
suggestions.
By July 1993, a host of public interest groups (Safe 
Energy Communication Council, U.S. Public Interest Research 
Group, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Public 
Citizen, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Center for 
Policy Alternatives) wrote a collective letter to President 
Bill Clinton urging an independent review of the program. (7) 
The GAO also testified before the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, and the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral 
Resources under the Committee on Natural Resources, on the 
topic of ""Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Management 
and Funding Issues.'' (8)
Congressmen Phillip R. Sharp and Richard Lehman sent a 
letter to the Secretary of the DoE O'Leary in August 1993,
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followed by other letters to President Clinton from various 
U.S. Senators and from Nevada Gov. Bob Miller, all urging an 
in-depth review. The Technical Review Board sent another 
letter report to Congress and O'Leary in February 1994, 
preceding the GAO's latest call for an independent review of 
the high-level nuclear waste program. With all of these 
concerns being expressed, a good question to ask is: Why has
the issue failed to draw attention at the presidential level? 
One educated guess would be the change in White House 
administrations from that of Republican George Bush to 
Democrat Bill Clinton. Perhaps in the transition from one 
administration to another, high-level nuclear waste 
management ranks low on the list of priorities, as compared 
to the economy, education, health, nuclear weapons worldwide, 
Bosnia, Haiti, the Middle East, and other high-profile 
problems.
Or perhaps there are other reasons the matter did not 
come to official attention. One view was offered by a GAO 
official appearing before the Nevada Nuclear Projects 
Commission in October 1994. He said that despite growing 
concern about the program, there was no appetite in Congress 
or at the executive level for such a review, because 
conventional wisdom held that the issue of nuclear waste 
management had been resolved in the 1980s legislation. 
Dwayne E. Weigel, Assistant Director of Energy and Science 
Issues for the GAO, has been a policy analyst on nuclear
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issues for twenty eight years. When he spoke to the Nevada 
Commission, he said that the GAO was not the only agency 
concerned with the current program's organization and 
management of nuclear waste. (9) The Office of Technical 
Assessment recommended in the early 1980s a new, single­
mission agency, rather than the DoE, for solving the nation's 
problem of nuclear waste storage and disposal. A recent study 
by the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition, a group of state 
public utility commissions, also concluded that the DoE 
should not manage the program. The earliest any repository 
site could open is the year 2010, and that date is 
optimistic, Weigel said. Therefore, some alternatives to 
managing the nuclear waste stream have been offered, such as 
dry-cask storage at the reactor sites.
In the GAO'S latest report, issued in September 1994, 
the Congressional investigators insisted that such a broad- 
based review, including social and economic impacts, was 
vital for the success of a national nuclear waste management 
program;
"Important characteristics that an independent 
review body should have include requisite expertise in such 
areas as nuclear waste and public policy and administration, 
clear access to DoE's records of the program's performance, 
and a mechanism to provide public access to the review body's 
findings and recommendations.'' (10)
The GAO also called for a funding freeze for the Yucca
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
Mountain Project at current levels until the independent 
review is complete.
First Alternative;
In criticisms by State of Nevada officials, the GAO, and 
other reviewers, the necessity of an independent study of the 
entire management process has been stressed. By drawing on 
scientists, economists, sociologists, utilities 
representatives, environmentalists, ethicists and other 
interested parties outside the DoE, such an in-depth review 
could offer a more impartial approach to the entire problem 
of managing nuclear wastes, both those remaining from 50 
years of nuclear weapons-making and spent fuel burned up in 
nuclear reactors across the nation. Either the President or 
Congress could launch such a review before any further 
progress on the site characterization studies is required. 
[This type of independent study should proceed beyond the 
current financial review of the Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management organized by Energy Secretary 
Hazel O'Leary last year.] If the DoE objected to stopping 
site characterization work, then the agency should be limited 
to basic research, such as surface mapping, analysis of 
samples already collected, and other non-intrusive studies. 
For a broad, in-depth review such as I am suggesting, the 
President or Congress would have to initiate it. In addition
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to scientific and economic reviews, the proposed study would 
also examine social, ethical, and constitutional issues 
raised under the current program; that is, the impact on 
hundreds of thousands of residents living near nuclear 
reactors now and along future nuclear waste shipping routes, 
the fairness of locating a nuclear waste repository in a 
state (Nevada) in which there is no nuclear reactor operating 
and no benefits received from nuclear reactors, and the 
equity of imposing a radioactive repository on an unwilling 
state or community, especially a site which has shouldered 
the burden of nuclear weapons testing, both above and below 
the ground, for the past forty years.
The constitutional issues should be of particular 
concern to each level of government involved in the nuclear 
waste program. The most important constitutional basis which 
Nevada has to oppose the dump resides in Amendment X:
" T h e  powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.''
James Madison clearly noted that this provision was not 
conceived to be a yardstick for measuring the powers granted 
to the Federal Government or reserved to the States. For 
about a century, from 1837 to 1937, the Tenth Amendment was 
frequently invoked to curtail powers expressly granted to 
Congress, especially the powers to regulate interstate 
commerce, to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and to lay and
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collect taxes. The first defense of states' rights before the 
U.S. Supreme Court occurred in behalf of the 
constitutionality of certain State acts after the Civil War 
in a tax case. Collector v. Day. In 1939 that case was 
expressly overruled. In the case of Yucca Mountain, Deputy 
Attorney General of Nevada Harry Swainston has addressed the 
arguments of injury to the state if a nuclear repository is 
built. Swainston's argument rests on the fact that the United 
States is attempting to use Nevada resources, namely the 
health and safety of its citizens, to the benefit of 49 other 
states. (11)
Swainston further argues that there is no provision in 
the U.S. Constitution which justifies or gives authority to 
the federal government to force a toxic byproduct or harmful 
material onto one state. Further, the State of Nevada has 
not accepted any benefits in exchange for disposing of the 
nuclear wastes, and in 1989 the Nevada Legislature outlawed 
storing or disposing of high-level nuclear waste within the 
state (NRS 459.910), he said. On the other hand, if Nevada 
or a local affected unit of government within the state 
invited the DoE to do business, there would be a joint 
venture and equal liability for any harm or accidents related 
to the nuclear wastes, Swainston said. Although the Price- 
Anderson Act protects citizens in case of accident, it does 
not cover injuries or perceptions of risk or harm to the area 
as a result of an accident, unless there is a substantial
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release of radioactivity. In fact, the federal government 
may not be held liable at all. In a recent case in New 
Mexico, City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 1992, (12) a couple sued 
the state after the federal government took a slice of their 
ranch for a road leading to the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Project, near Carlsbad, N.M. The Supreme Court of New Mexico 
held the state liable for the perception of the loss in 
value of the Komis property, because the road led to a 
nuclear waste repository. The case and its $1 million 
compensation awarded by a jury has been upheld on appeal.
Meanwhile, the federal government is opposing any broad- 
based independent review of its nuclear waste management 
program. In response to the GAO and the NRC criticisms, 
Daniel Dreyfus, the director of the DoE's Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management, said he did not support an 
independent review of the disposal program because such a 
review would almost certainly put the repository project at a 
"'serious disadvantage in maintaining progress and competing 
for funds.'' (13) Each year Congress parcels out monies for 
research at Yucca Mountain from a mil, or .001 cent per 
kilowatt hour, fee paid by customers of nuclear power plants. 
Although the Yucca Mountain project had been estimated to 
cost between $1 billion and $2 billion in 1982 by Sen. 
Bennett Johnston, D-Louisiana, the projected cost today, 
according to Dreyfus, is $6.3 billion to characterize the 
site alone. Dreyfus has asked Congess to take the repository
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Study off the federal budget so that the DoE can spend 
sufficient funds in the next two years to meet the licensing 
process required by the NRC in early 2000, thus keeping the 
repository on schedule to open in the year 2 010 if Yucca 
Mountain proves suitable. Dreyfus said he did not discount 
scientific uncertainty, since the project is complex and 
researchers could run into more problems to explore.
However, the GAO said in its report that the benefits of 
an independent review may be worth the risk of smaller 
funding packages from Congress. With less funds while an in- 
depth review took place, federal monies would not be wasted. 
Since the makeup of Congress has changed so drastically in 
the November 8, 1994 election, whether the members will be 
willing to consider Senator Johnston's plan to give the DoE 
more money to do its site characterization work during 1995 
is uncertain. Already the Senate Natural Resources and Energy 
Committee has told DoE Energy Secretary O'Leary there is no 
chance to amend the 1982-87 legislation to deliver more money 
to the Yucca Mountain Project. With more Republicans in 
Congress, the appetite to solve this lingering waste problem 
may push faster studies at Yucca Mountain and even prompt a 
move to store high-level nuclear waste at the Nevada Test 
Site. Whether energy policy or the issue of nuclear waste 
management will have a place set at the Congressional table 
beside such bread-and-butter issues as the economy, crime, 
welfare reform, job training, health care, and defense
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readiness remains to be seen.
Nuclear utilties are, naturally, furious about the 
delays in repository siting. In June 1994, a number of 
utilities, states, and state utility commissions filed two 
separate suits in federal court, asserting the DoE has not 
complied with waste acceptance provisions of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. Their suits were 
brought to force the DoE to accept spent nuclear fuel rods in 
1998, the date the federal agency had promised to open the 
first repository. The suits seek not only acceptance of the 
wastes by January 31, 1998, but a declarative ruling that the 
DOE'S decision not to begin accepting waste by that date was 
not in accord with the law.
The GAO had recommended in 1991 that the DoE develop 
plans in case it could not accept spent fuel by 1998. That is 
why the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was created in 
the 1987 amendments, to try to reach a voluntary solution to 
temporary storage in case of major delays with studies at the 
Yucca Mountain site. The failure of this portion of the 1987 
amendments was acknowledged by the Energy Secretary in early 
1994, when the DoE announced its intent to develop by 1998 a 
system of waste containers, the multipurpose canister system, 
that could be used for storing, transporting and disposing of 
the wastes. This proposal is expected to cost an extra $254 
million over four years to develop, but the DoE would have a 
partial solution for encapsulating the spent fuel rods by
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1998. However, there is no basis for designing such 
multipurpose containers, the GAO and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission have argued, because Yucca Mountain studies have 
not proceeded far enough to determine how the safest casks 
should be made. There are not enough soil studies completed 
to decide on what materials might be used in a container, and 
the site itself has not been deemed suitable. Whether Yucca 
Mountain is determined suitable or unsuitable as a disposal 
site, the DoE could be forced to spend more money to develop 
yet another container for disposal, if the multipurpose 
canister cannot do the job, depending upon how complex the 
mountain is, or whether another location is chosen, according 
to the DoE's own scientists.
In the meantime, the Mescalero Apache Indian tribe voted 
490-362 on January 31, 1995 not to accept temporary nuclear 
waste storage on their New Mexico reservation near Carlsbad, 
but in a dramatic turnaround, on a second vote taken March 9, 
1995 the tribe voted 593-372 to negotiate with the Energy 
Secretary. The Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator is no 
longer in existence. It was abolished by law at the end of 
January, 1995. In the case of the Mescaleros, the tribe now 
would negotiate with Energy Secretary O'Leary. However, the 
State of New Mexico is objecting to the temporary site on 
Indian lands, including an appeal to the federal government.
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Second Alternative;
As a second alternative, perhaps it is time for the 
nuclear utilities to initiate some short-term solutions on 
their own, in case of further DoE program delays or the court 
does not agree with them about the federal government's 
responsibility for taking the spent fuel rods by 1998. If 
they must keep the waste, there is a method of on-site 
storage already approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
in 1992. That is dry cask storage, a method some utilities 
have already initiated and which is simpler than waiting for 
the proposed multipurpose containers. Instead of leaving the 
radioactive rods in pools of water at the reactors, they 
would be removed and placed in sealed containers above ground 
and kept dry while air circulation would cool them and 
radiation would be monitored. The NRC said in 1992 this 
temporary storage method could continue from thirty years to 
one hundred years.
The advantages to this approach include; 1) Since the 
waste would be stored on site, public fears over 
transportating high-level nuclear waste across country to a 
repository are eliminated for at least a century; 2) Removes 
the deadline of the year 2010 for opening a national 
repository; 3) Allows time for a review of the DoE, initiated 
either by the President or the Congress, to determine the 
course of the national nuclear waste management program. The
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major disadvantage, from the utilities' viewpoint, is the 
expense. While study costs at Yucca Mountain could continue 
to rise sharply, at the same time the nuclear energy 
companies would have to buy storage containers and maintain 
them on site for an indefinite period of time. Another 
disadvantage from the DoE's perspective is that with 110 
reactor sites scattered around the country, the spent fuel 
rods sitting in dry casks could also be terrorism targets. 
However, the dry casks could be guarded or camouflaged, 
similar to those areas containing nuclear weapons today.
Although the DoE has proposed a multiple-purpose 
canister system to contain the waste from the time it leaves 
the reactor, through shipping, storage, and to placement in 
the final repository, success of the proposal is not assured. 
Public hearings on the multipurpose container project began 
in November 1994. By the time the containers are ready to be 
manufactured it could be another two to four years. The DoE 
has proposed to bundle twenty-one spent nuclear fuel rods 
into one canister that ultimately could weigh from seventy- 
five tons to one hundred twenty five tons. The weight of the 
containers themselves poses transportation problems if Yucca 
Mountain is pronounced suitable as a nuclear waste 
repository. Heavy shipments across the nation's existing 
highways or rail tracks could cause accidents or breakdowns, 
or create de facto storage sites across the country if a 
loaded truck or train stalls. Another disadvantage at this
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time is the fact that the Southern Nevada repository site has 
no rail line to it. It has been estimated by the DoE that 
building tracks to Yucca Mountain from existing rail routes 
could cost $1 million a mile, adding further costs to the 
already expensive nuclear waste program as it exists today. 
There are other uncertainties with the proposed canisters 
themselves. Problems with such an arrangement as proposed in 
the multipurpose canisters solution include exposing 
packaging workers or shipping drivers to harmful radiation if 
the shield failed, the container melting from the heat of the 
packed rods, or a nuclear criticality, where a radioactive 
chain reaction could be initiated on the road, in storage or 
at a repository site. A final decision on the containers will 
not be announced by the DoE until 1996, if it can be proven 
to safely store the wastes.
The DoE's Dreyfus has told Congress alternative storage 
plans need to be explored. When Congress convened in 1995 the 
ideas of on-site storage in dry casks, or regional temporary 
repositories chosen by negotiating with the Energy 
Department, had not been considered, although the Office of 
Nuclear Waste Negotiator ceased to exist on January 31. The 
DoE has proposed in its 1996 budget to save $1 million a year 
by eliminating the negotiator's independent position. The DoE 
could offer to help the utilities buy dry cask containers for 
storage, or Congress could allocate monies from the Nuclear 
Ratepayers Trust Fund to help pay the utilities for purchase
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of the dry casks. Another temporary solution offered by the 
nuclear industry is to store the spent nuclear fuel at the 
Nevada Test Site, former location of the nation's continental 
nuclear weapons experiments for forty years. The Test Site, 
it is argued, is already a federal reserve, and would require 
no negotiations with the State of Nevada to provide storage. 
(14) However, it is certain that the state would sue the 
government to keep the high-level nuclear waste some place 
else. Once again, there is no rail line leading onto the 
Nevada Test Site or Yucca Mountain. Besides, the current 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act does not allow storing nuclear 
wastes temporarily at a site under consideration as a 
permanent geological burial ground.
Third Alternative:
A third alternative would alloi congress to re-open the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act as amended, while putting any 
further research at Yucca Mountain and its attendant funding 
on hold. Under this scenario, the Congress would return to 
the basic questions blocking solutions to nuclear waste 
management as well as amending the current national energy 
policy, namely:
1. Should the United States invest in more alternative 
energy resources, such as natural gas development, solar 
power, geothermal production, or wind farming? The Clinton
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Administration has already favored natural gas development. 
The technology for solar energy, in particular, has taken a 
quantum leap since the 1982 NWPA or its 1987 amendments, and 
converting sunlight to electricity has become much faster and 
less expensive. A public-private partnership at the Nevada 
Test Site has been proposed by Enron Corp., of Houston, 
Texas, with the DoE. The solar project was initiated by the 
Nevada congressional delegation, notably Sen. Richard Bryan, 
D-Nev., who has been a consistent opponent of the high-level 
nuclear repository and supports finding alternative uses for 
the Nevada Test Site. Most of the technological progress in 
solar technology has occurred since 1992, as solar cells 
themselves have been transformed into more efficient and more 
inexpensive collectors. Geothermal resources are bound by the 
location and the availability of underground hot springs in 
the earth. Wind farming has been tried on an experimental 
basis in Hawaii and California, and the state of Illinois is 
trying it on a small scale. Meanwhile, with the shift in 
parties in Congress after the November elections, more 
domestic development of oil may be sought. These and other 
resources offer options to be explored.
2. Should the nation continue to produce more nuclear 
power? This question depends on the public's appetite for 
nuclear energy. In dozens of polls taken over the past 
fourteen years, people want the reassurance of power on 
demand, but do not support nuclear energy because of its
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waste products. Since this nation is still based on 
democratic principles, if the public is serious about finding 
and supporting energy alternatives and national leaders are 
equally serious about putting the United States on a firm 
foundation independent of Mid-East oil, then a discussion to 
resolve such alternatives is due. This is a question 
requiring public participation, and the people should realize 
how the nation already subsidizes the nuclear fuel cycle 
through enriched uranium subsidies, insurance to the nuclear 
industry (the Price-Anderson Act), and the support for 
burying nuclear wastes. All of these subsidies are paid in 
whole or in part by taxpayers, as well as contributions from 
nuclear ratepayers. The debate also encompasses finding a 
temporary solution to managing nuclear wastes, since the 
nation is not approaching a final solution for disposing of 
them, whether in Yucca Mountain or at another site.
3. How can the nation wean itself from fossil fuels? 
Once again, this discussion needs to be opened and broad 
enough so comparisons among energy sources such as oil vs. 
nuclear vs. solar vs. natural gas vs. geothermal may be fully 
explored. The advantages and disadvantages vary with each 
source. For example, is it possible to produce oil 
domestically? How much does it cost to import foreign oil? 
Are taxpayers willing to pay more for solar energy at first, 
when collectors and distribution systems are necessary? Are 
taxpayers willing to pay for oil spill cleanups?
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4. How much are the taxpayers willing to pay for any 
energy source? This is a very important issue, since voters 
nationwide in the November 8, 1994 election seemed to have 
sent a clear message they want less government, but are not 
willing to give up some entitlement programs, such as Social 
Security. The question at the national level is who leads the 
revolution for providing enough energy to keep up with the 
power demands of U.S. society? After the energy crisis of 
the 1970s, Americans became aware of how precarious the oil 
pipeline can be, but in the 1980s and 1990s the pain of 
lengthy gas lines has almost been forgotten. Normally, an 
alternative energy source costs more to initiate, whether it 
is solar or wind-driven. The costs over time should 
diminish. In the case of nuclear power, to clean up hazardous 
radioactive wastes, the DoE is preparing to ask Congress to 
provide more funding sooner, rather than later, to rid the 
nuclear industry of its end product and the concurrent 
liability. The industry's strategy seems to be once the 
government takes charge of the nuclear waste, it will be able 
to revive the research necessary to sell a new generation of 
nuclear reactors to the public. First, however, the nation's 
leaders should ask the public for help in managing nuclear 
wastes, and whether to continue relying on nuclear power 
generation. The basic question to the American public is 
which energy resources should the nation develop and at what 
cost? These other considerations I have offered should be
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carefully compared and each alternative explored from 
scientific, economic, ethical, and social positions before 
the nation comes to a final decision.
5. Is geologic disposal scientifically sound? Critics 
such as philosopher-scientist K.S. Shrader-Frechette and 
Nevada elected officials and their consultants have urged the 
DoE to leave the spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites in dry- 
cask storage until the radioactivity cools off. Physicist 
Charles Bowman of the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
advocates transmutation for the nuclear wastes to remove 
dangerous plutonium, or, as an alternative to Yucca Mountain 
—  which he believes could explode in a nuclear chain 
reaction —  to bury radioactive wastes in granite formations 
found in New England and Canada.
Although I consider three alternative approaches to 
nuclear waste management above, it would not be a realistic 
analysis without reviewing a " n o  action'' alternative, an 
avenue required under the federal National Environmental 
Policy Act as well. If the nuclear utilities allowed the 
spent fuel rods to continue accumulating in "swimming 
pools'' of water at the reactors operating across the nation, 
executives and researchers estimate they will run out of 
capacity. How soon this might happen remains uncertain, since 
scientists may be able to discover ways to keep more spent 
fuel rods closer together in the pools, or stack them on dry 
land in a different configuration than they are currently
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kept. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which licenses 
nuclear reactors in the United States, may also allow older 
reactors to continue operating until the nuclear waste issue 
is resolved for the interim.
Along with the no action alternative, utilities 
themselves could begin dry cask storage on land, away from 
the aging storage pools. As mentioned above, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission has already approved of above-ground, 
dry cask containment for up to a century. In turn, the 
utilities have been unwilling to begin massive temporary on­
site storage of the fuel rods, because it is expensive. The 
DoE has agreed to investigate ways to possibly help fund dry 
cask storage at the sites, although this is not a preferred 
national alternative. President Jimmy Carter abandoned on­
site storage of spent fuel rods, leading to reprocessing the 
fuel and reinstalling it in the reactors, for fear of nuclear 
materials proliferation or acts of terrorism could spread 
nuclear materials around the world used in nuclear weapons. 
The danger would be if terrorists could hold the free world 
hostage with such weapons built from U.S. nuclear materials.
III. Analysis;
It is apparent, even from a basic and cursory review of 
the controversy surrounding the U.S. approach to managing its 
nuclear wastes, that an independent review is needed 
immediately. By February 1994, twenty seven members of the
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House of Representatives had written to the President, urging 
him to appoint a presidential commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the nation's needs, policies, and 
programs on the issue of nuclear waste management. In March 
1994, the Senate introduced Senate Bill S. 1928, the "Second 
Generation Nuclear Waste Act,'' to, among an array of 
actions, ensure adequate nuclear waste disposal capacity. A 
dozen Senators proposed, in a letter to the President, an 
independent review by a presidential commission of all 
nuclear waste programs and policies. All of the above 
proposals point out the fundamental need for a review 
independent of the DoE. Not only is the DoE's credibility 
tarnished, but the financing of the project has raised deep 
concerns from all quarters, including all Energy Secretaries 
serving under the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan 
and George Bush.
Besides independence from the DoE, a review of nuclear 
waste management should include characteristics such as 
required expertise in such areas as nuclear waste, public 
policy, administration, socioeconomic impact, risk 
assessment, and the ethics of risk assignment. In addition, 
any such review must be able to access the DoE's records 
concerning the program's performance, an important point made 
by the GAO. Finally, and most important, the independent 
review process must provide public access to the review 
body's findings and recommendations, and a mechanism allowing
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public criticism and comments on its conclusions. The main 
task of such a policy analysis is not to determine 
theoretical solutions, but to raise issues, question 
assumptions, stimulate debate, and especially educate 
citizens to distinguish between good and bad reasons so they 
may make an informed choice. I believe the DoE has failed to
educate the public about the range of alternatives for
storage, options for long-term storage or disposal, hazards
attached to each course of action, and limits to the current 
nuclear waste management approach. (15) Perhaps this should 
not be the DoE's responsibility, but an independent
scientific-economic-ethics-and-policy review body instituted 
for the sole purpose of public education about nuclear waste 
management.
When the Director of DoE's Office of Civlilian 
Radioactive Waste Management commented on a similar proposal 
by the GAO, he said he did not support such an independent 
review. However, if a review is to be launched, it should be 
done by Congress and/or the President. Any significant policy 
changes will depend on Congressional authorization and 
funding, according to Daniel Dreyfus, the OCRWM Director. 
Some of the policy issues may be addressed by the Congress 
during the 1995 session. However, a piecemeal approach is not 
recommended here. The House Committee on Appropriations, in 
its report on the appropriations for energy and water 
development for fiscal 1995, cited the Nuclear Waste
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Technical Review Board's recommended independent review of 
the management and organizational structure of DoE's civilian 
radioactive waste management program. This House report 
recognized that the NWTRB repeatedly expressed its concern 
about the lack of progress in studies at the Yucca Mountain 
site. In its latest report, the committee called progress on 
site characterization dismal at best.'' (16)
Purely from an economic viewpoint, an independent review 
is warranted. While the House Committee recommended $4 34 
million, or about $99 million less than the DoE requested 
(but about $54 million more than it had received) in fiscal 
year 1994 for waste management, the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations recommended the DoE's full requested amount of 
about $533 million. A subsequent conference committee bill 
recommended and the Congress approved about $52 3 million, or 
about $143 million more than appropriations for the program 
in fiscal year 1994. On August 26, 1994, the President signed 
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for 
fiscal year 1995 (P.L. 103-316), providing the compromised 
amount of about $523 million for the program for fiscal year 
1995. Of the total, about $392.8 million has been 
appropriated from the Nuclear Waste Fund collected from 
nuclear utility ratepayers; another $129.4 million 
appropriated for Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal; and about 
$0.7 million is available for Civilian Waste Research and 
Development. An obvious question is, has the money been well
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spent? This is a central question for a broad, independent 
review of the entire program.
Although Congress recognizes a need to complete 
scientific investigations at Yucca Mountain as expeditiously 
as possible, it is also aware that changes are needed to 
ensure scientific investigations are effective and efficient. 
These concerns are displayed in congressional budget action, 
as noted above. The GAO has shared the concerns of Congress, 
and pointed out in previous reviews, that from 1991 through 
1994, about 65 cents of every $1 has been spent on the Yucca 
Mountain Project. Of that amount, some 28 cents of every $1 
spent at Yucca Mountain has been dedicated to scientific 
study, while the rest of the money has supported 
administration, contractors, and facilities, or overhead 
costs rather than scientific studies, although the disparity 
between the DoE's budget requests and actual levels of 
appropriations have been at great odds. The DoE acknowledged 
its high infrastructure costs, maintaining they occurred, in 
part, because the agency could not predict future 
appropriations with certainty when planning future work. The 
DOE'S budget is mapped out two years in advance, but should 
be no excuse for continuously submitting budgets that are too 
ambitious. This high cost of infrastructure is another good 
reason for an independent review of the program.
To counteract its high levels of projected funding, the 
DoE has developed a more modest approach to its planned
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activities at Yucca Mountain, complete with funding targets 
and estimates of the project's schedule and costs. While the 
DoE would meet its deadline for accepting waste by 1998 under 
its latest plan, scientific studies would continue long after 
the repository was open in 2010 and accepting waste. To do 
this, the DoE has requested Congess to amend the NWPA as 
amended and allow retrieval of the radioactive waste for up 
to 100 years, rather than the current 50 years. Under its 
proposed program approach, the DoE would accomplish its goals 
by deferring some of the scientific work and testing 
originally planned until after a repository construction 
authorization was received from the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. The work, according to the DoE, is relatively 
lower priority site investigations that would not prevent 
licensing the repository by the NRG. The State of Nevada has 
objected to this shift in scientific studies and the 
accelerated funding approach, especially on delaying surface- 
based studies of the mountain and its pneumatic 
characteristics. The U.S. Geological Survey is still mapping 
faulting characteristics on the surface of the mountain, and 
the porosity of Yucca Mountain's volcanic rock, allowing it 
to "breathe,'' has raised scientific concerns that 
radioactive Carbon-14 gas may escape from the repository (See 
Chapter One).
The DoE's proposed approach has raised concerns and 
questions about how to balance costs, schedules, public
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health and safety issues. Both the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board have 
concluded, based on the limited information available from 
the DoE, that the Energy Department's proposal for a fast- 
track, pre-license schedule would increase technical and 
scientific uncertainties inherent in determining whether the 
site is suitable and whether it could be licensed for use as 
a permanent geological repository. Since such a project has 
never been accomplished before, the DoE's approach must be 
classified as a scientific experiment, and treated as such. 
There is no certain outcome under a realistic approach. Here 
is where the wheeling and dealing of the political arena has 
overcome the scientific approach, as Rosemarie Tong pointed 
out in Ethics in Policy Analysis. (17) When the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 was amended, the scientific search 
for a suitable site was pushed aside as Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada was the single site chosen for study as a nuclear 
waste repository. The legislation forced federal scientists 
into an untenable position, as they have to prove the site is 
suitable, since there are no alternative locations under 
consideration. As I argued in Chapter Four, politics 
abrogated any true scientific approach to nuclear waste 
disposal, and the 1987 Amendments themselves eliminated the 
need for public participation, just as public debate by the 
elected representatives was eliminated during the time the 
policy was fashioned in Congress by Senator Johnston. It is
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time to broaden the political and technical basis of these 
decisions, for the way by which legislation has been enacted 
makes it appear that public consent has been engineered'' 
by the political process.
Since there is evidence of scientific uncertainty and an 
increasing need for funding for the Yucca Mountain nuclear 
waste repository program, it seems a broad, independent 
review of the policy basis underpinning nuclear waste 
management is long overdue. Coupled with growing 
congressional and public concern about the current program's 
pace, cost, and direction, a comprehensive review, such as I 
have outlined in the first option appears reasonable. Barring 
such a sweeping study, I would choose the third option, to 
address the immediate and future energy resources and program 
concerns. Key issues already identified by the Congress, the 
GAO, the NRC, the NWTRB, and others include storing waste, 
either onsite or within regions, until a permanent solution 
is agreed upon, providing adequate funding for scientific 
studies to find a solution, reorganizing the DoE's program 
administration and management or replacing the DoE with an 
independent organization, and regulating a repository's 
development in full accord with the nation's health, safety 
and environmental laws. Whatever options are proposed, to 
implement such fundamental changes will require changes to 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. In third 
place, I would choose the second option, but this one, in my
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opinion, does not go far enough.
Daniel Dreyfus, the Director of the Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management does not support an independent 
review of the DoE's disposal program and policies, because he 
believes the program and its repository project would be 
effectively relegated to a sort of caretaker status and lose 
time and funding during a lengthy review. Then the reviewers 
might recommend major redirection of the entire project, 
according to the director, putting the current project at a 
serious disadvantage in its competition for funding with 
other federal programs, and maintaining scientific progress. 
The director warned Congress that if an independent review is 
undertaken, it may affect site characterization work at Yucca 
Mountain. Depending on how far Congress is willing to change 
courses, the Yucca Mountain Project should either be delayed 
or eliminated. Since 300 generations of Americans are 
involved in this debate, such delay should not be rejected 
out of hand.
The benefits from an independent review, accomplished in 
a balanced, objective and sophisticated way and independent 
of the DoE, appear to benefit the goals the Congress is 
seeking, and may be worth the risk of reducing funds 
available for the Yucca Mountain Project during the review 
process. This balancing act between health and safety, 
funding, progress, and reaching sound solutions are an 
example of the difficult choices facing both policy analysts
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and decisionmakers in proceeding to solve problems in an 
efficient and effective way. Whatever avenue is chosen, 
however, technology and an engineered solution made in 
Congress by political elites or outside of the public's view, 
do not satisfy the democratic process that such an enormous 
problem demands.
In my opinion, the most important element in any of the 
alternatives I have suggested is public participation. Is 
there an avenue for including spirited public debate, with an 
informed people, on the issue of nuclear waste management, 
and beyond that, a national debate on U.S. energy policy? I 
believe there are at least two methods to enhance public 
access and accountability to this enormous task. Once these 
ideas become public, it is hoped that more avenues for 
contributing to the public debate will appear.
Instead of the DoE or nuclear funded groups calling 
public meetings and workshops where the information is 
presented from a single viewpoint alone, perhaps a consultant 
or independent group skilled at fostering public debate could 
organize regional "Town Hall'' events, places where people 
could meet face-to-face to ask questions, gain information 
both pro and con on the government's plans for nuclear waste 
management, discuss the issues and offer opinions on the 
basis of what they have learned. First, by removing the DoE 
and the nuclear industry from the responsibility and control 
of the content of the meetings, discussions might be more
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informative and free-flowing. Second, the meetings would be 
open to serious suggestions, debate and deliberations, if 
enough ideas were offered. Third, these meetings must be on a 
small enough scale so participants know one another, yet 
their comments or consensus must be taken seriously, another 
reason to choose an independent party rather than the DoE for 
organizing the meetings. Here is a chance for such broad- 
based and neutral groups as the League of Women Voters or the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science to supply 
the resources and a solid foundation for the public debate.
Another option is opening the channels of communication 
through network television, cable television, computer 
bulletin boards, and radio. Most important in this mix would 
be how to record comments from as many people as might care 
to participate. For any of these media, responders could be 
given a mailing address or a telephone number with a recorder 
on it to take comments. For computer users, an e-mail address 
would be appropriate. The stumbling block here is how to 
offer information to people so they may comment with some 
intelligence. Once again, I believe the sources must be 
divorced from the DoE or other interested parties involved in 
the current nuclear waste program. This does not mean that I  
am opposing participation by the DoE or the nuclear 
utilities, only that an independent organization offer the 
information in a straightforward and balanced manner. After 
comments are received, then an independent organization
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should gather and review the comments, seek appropriate 
replies to them, and publish them for the general public to 
consider, including responses from the DoE to appropriate 
questions. This entire endeavor could take as little as a 
year to complete from information output until a final report 
is issued for public review, or up to two years, depending on 
the variety of media chosen to participate in this electronic 
public forum.
Unless and until the public becomes active in this 
important debate on the future of energy resources and 
nuclear waste management, I do not believe there will be a 
solution to the U.S. nuclear waste problems. If the current 
course of legislation and its attendant revisiting of 
previous legislation, along with current DoE management 
practices continues, the disposal of nuclear waste could be 
delayed for decades in courtroom battles or never be 
accomplished at all, for eventually it will become too 
expensive over the long spans of time.
IV. Conclusion:
As Congressional concerns and public dissatisfaction 
continue to mount over the pace, direction, and increased 
funding for the nuclear waste program, an urgency surrounds 
the need to conduct an independent review of the entire
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program and its attendant policies. Such a review should 
include key issues, including interim storage of nuclear 
waste, adequate funding for the program's objectives and 
goals, once they are in focus, the management and 
organization of the the project and the program, and how the 
program should be regulated. While the Secretary of Energy 
has attempted to review the financing of the Yucca Mountain 
Project, a much broader and more in-depth analysis is needed 
to address the entire program and its future.
The DoE began to address some concerns, such as 
restructuring the management of the program and the 
organization of its contractors, which may shed considerable 
light on the current status of the program, but a much 
broader and deeper analysis of the fundamental energy issues 
is necessary to begin to tackle the overarching problems and 
issues endemic in the system. An independent review could 
potentially uncover basic changes necessary to accomplish the 
ongoing task of managing the nation's nuclear waste. Added 
to this perspective, the DoE's own proposal for realigning 
its Yucca Mountain Project has not been approved by Congress, 
and a new spectrum of representatives elected to that body, 
adds another dimension of uncertainties and risks to the 
entire nuclear waste management process, as well as to the 
current proposed solution.
Once an independent review of the disposal program is 
completed, its insight could support Congress through the
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best possible information for evaluating the performance of 
the DoE's program, helping make future funding decisions, and 
making any necessary fundamental changes to the entire 
program. An independent review body should have and include 
the following important characteristics: expertise in the 
science of nuclear waste "containment'', public policy 
(including genuine participation instead of a " p r '' 
approach), administration, public health and safety, 
socioeconomic impacts, risk analysis, and the ethical 
problems inherent in risk assignment. The reviewers also 
require total access to the DoE's records of the existing 
program's performance. And finally, the review must provide 
public access to study and critique the independent body's 
findings, recommendations, and conclusions.
The entire concept for such a far-reaching review of the 
U.S. nuclear waste program has its foundation in a true 
independence from the DoE and its contractors. There is no 
basis for trust in a review conducted by the Energy 
Department. For example, the limited financial review 
underway as a result of the Energy Secretary's initiative 
provides fair warning for ensuring independence in any future 
studies of the program. An independent review would need a 
high-level charter, either from the Congress or the 
President. A presidential review could be ably overseen by 
Congress, if appropriate public hearings were conducted. The 
GAO has suggested appropriate entities for consideration to
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perform such a review, before Congress has to deal with the 
issue. They are a specially constituted congressional 
committee, a presidential commission, and/or the National 
Academy of Public Administration. No matter what avenue 
Congress takes, the discussion over these complex and serious 
issues ranging from energy needs to managing the nation's 
nuclear waste will continue for some time to come and must be 
accomplished in the sunlight of a democratic discussion, for 
the public has a right to know what alternatives are 
available to them now and for their future.
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management program. He said there had been no appetite 
among high officials to revisit the issues, although 
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for site characterization, both in the ratepayer trust 
fund and through defense funds diverted for the waste 
project.
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12. City of Santa Fe v. John Komis and Lemonia Komis was 
adjudicated before the Supreme Court of New Mexico on 
August 26, 1992. The court said that of the total 673.77 
total acres, the city took 431 acres of the property by 
condemning it on November 14, 1988. Following a jury 
trial, the Komises were awarded $884,192 in 
compensation, representing $489,582.50 for severance 
damages and $60,794.50 for severance damanges to the 
buffer zone, and $337,815 for severance damages " f o r  
perceived loss due to public perception.'' The jury 
entered its verdict on August 1, 1991, then the Komises 
filed a motion to modify judgment on August 20. The city 
filed an appeal on August 29. The trial court granted 
Komis's motion on August 30, increasing the interest 
rate for a total of $1 million. The high court upheld 
the increase in award.
13. GAO/RCED-94-299, p. 13.
14. Many people do not realize that Yucca Mountain is not 
part of the Nevada Test Site. The mountain is owned and 
operated by the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. 
Air Force. Both federal agencies have given the DoE 
permission to conduct site characterization at Yucca 
Mountain. Congress would have to formally withdraw the 
land if the mountain was deemed suitable for a nuclear 
waste repository. In the early 1980s, when it was 
mentioned as a possible nuclear disposal site, the Air 
Force raised strenuous objections, since Yucca Mountain 
is part of the flight path for training fighter pilots. 
By 1987 Congress gave permission for the DoE to continue 
studies at Yucca Mountain, but it has not been 
transfered to the Energy Department, which would be done 
if the site is found suitable as a nuclear repository. 
The DoE also considered its one and only "worst case" 
accident at Yucca Mountain as the crash of an Air Force 
fighter jet into the repository area. Any workers would 
be killed. No radiation estimates were offered, the DoE 
said, because no one would be there to read them.
15. Readings of Geiandomenico Majone's "Policy Analysis and 
Public Deliberation," The Power of Public Ideas, Chap. 
7, pgs. 157-178 and 247-248, Ballinger Publishing Co., 
who says: " T h e  main task of policy analysis, so 
conceived, is not to determine theoretically correct 
solutions, but to raise issues, probe assumptions, 
stimulate debate, and especially to educate citizens to 
distinguish between good and bad reasons.''
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In addition, Rosemarie Tong's The Role of the Expert in 
A Democratic Society, Ethics in Policy Analysis, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1986, 
Chap. 2. These suggestions of "amateur experts'' 
(Tong's term) and suggestions of involvement by ordinary 
people are extremely important on a major problem such 
as nuclear waste management. For too long, the public 
has relied on the DoE to host and conduct public 
meetings on the subject. If an independent "Town Hall'' 
type of meeting could be arranged, former DoE 
scientists, such as geologist Jerry Szymanski and Yucca 
Mountain Project Deputy Manager Maxwell Blanchard, might 
lend their expertise to the public during the 
discussion, for they no longer rely on the DoE for their 
careers. What the public has not heard during the entire 
nuclear waste program as it now stands is a debate on 
the scientific, social, ethical and economic issues 
surrounding the current plan.
16. GAO/RCED-94-299, Comprehensive Review of Disposal
Program, p. 9.
17. Tong, Rosemarie, Chapter 2, "Ethics, Epistemology, and 
the Expert,'' Ethics in Policy Analysis, Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1986. Throughout her 
work, Tong has criticized the exclusive "expert'' 
approach in dec is ion-making, and suggested numerous ways 
to bring the average citizen into the discussion, 
including use of "amateur experts,'' knowledgeable 
people trusted by the public.
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